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There is a hole at the heart of equal protection law. According to long-
established doctrine, one of the factors that determines whether a group is a 
suspect class is the group’s political powerlessness. But neither courts nor 
scholars have reached any kind of agreement as to the meaning of 
powerlessness. Instead, they have advanced an array of conflicting conceptions: 
numerical size, access to the franchise, financial resources, descriptive 
representation, and so on.  
My primary goal in this Article, then, is to offer a definition of political 
powerlessness that makes theoretical sense. The definition I propose is this: A 
group is relatively powerless if its aggregate policy preferences are less likely to 
be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups. I arrive at this 
definition in three steps. First, the powerlessness doctrine stems from Carolene 
Products’s account of “those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities.” Second, “those political processes” refer to pluralism, the 
idea that society is divided into countless overlapping groups, from whose 
shifting coalitions public policy emerges. And third, pluralism implies a 
particular notion of group power—one that (1) is continuous rather than binary; 
(2) spans all issues; (3) focuses on policy enactment; and (4) controls for group 
size; and (5) type. These are precisely the elements of my suggested definition. 
But I aim not just to theorize but also to operationalize in this Article. In the 
last few years, datasets have become available on groups’ policy preferences at 
the federal and state levels. Merging these datasets with information on policy 
outcomes, I am able to quantify my conception of group power. I find that blacks, 
women, and the poor are relatively powerless at both governmental levels; while 
whites, men, and the non-poor wield more influence. These results both support 
and subvert the current taxonomy of suspect classes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A week into the 2010 trial over California’s Proposition 8 (which banned 
same-sex marriage in the state), political scientist Gary Segura took the stand for 
the plaintiffs.1 For the next two days, he testified about gays’2 political power.3 It 
was quite low, in his view.4 Very few openly gay individuals held elected office.5 
Survey respondents felt less warmth toward gays than toward almost any other 
group.6 Gays were the most frequent victims of hate crimes.7 They also were the 
                                                 
1 See Transcript at 1522, Perry v. Schwartzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 
VRW) [hereinafter Perry Transcript]; see also Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 937, 943, 945, 951-52 (discussing 
Segura and Miller’s testimony). 
2 For the sake of brevity, I use “gay” throughout the Article as shorthand for “gay, lesbian, bisexual, or 
transgender” and “homosexual.” 
3 See Perry Transcript at 1522-1881. 
4 See id. at 1646 (“I conclude that gays and lesbians lack the sufficient power necessary to protect 
themselves in the political system.”). 
5 See id. at 1556 (less than 1% of local, state, and federal officials are openly gay). 
6 See id. at 1563 (average warmth score of 49.4 toward gays was 15-20 points lower than average scores 
toward blacks and Hispanics). 
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most frequent targets of hostile ballot initiatives, which succeeded more than 
70% of the time.8 And discriminatory policies in areas such as adoption, 
employment, and marriage were in force in a majority of states.9 
On the trial’s tenth day, another political scientist, Kenneth Miller, took the 
stand for the defense.10 Miller also testified for two days about gays’ political 
power.11 But, unlike Segura, he concluded that it was substantial.12 Gays raised 
and spent large sums of money in salient campaigns (like the one against 
Proposition 8).13 They enjoyed access to powerful lawmakers.14 Their allies 
included Democratic officeholders at all levels, organized labor, many 
corporations, and the media.15 Candidates endorsed by gay rights groups 
prevailed at the polls more often than not.16 And anti-discrimination laws, hate 
crime penalties, and domestic partnership benefits existed in several states.17 
Why did Segura and Miller focus so keenly on gays’ political clout?18 The 
answer is that, under hornbook equal protection law, a group’s political 
powerlessness is one of several factors that bear on whether the group is a 
suspect class entitled to heightened judicial protection.19 If gays are a suspect 
class, then laws that discriminate against them, such as bans on same-sex 
marriage, are subject to more rigorous scrutiny. But if gays are not a suspect 
class, then laws targeting them must survive only rational basis review. Political 
powerlessness matters because it helps determine suspect class status. 
More importantly for present purposes, why did Segura and Miller cite so 
many different conceptions of political influence—the number of gays in office, 
feeling thermometer scores, hate crime statistics, money deployed in elections, 
alliances with other groups, the fate of endorsed candidates, and so forth?20 The 
explanation is not verbosity. Rather, it is the Supreme Court’s conflicting and 
atheoretical pronouncements about what it means by powerlessness. At different 
times, the Court has referred to a group’s numerical size, its access to the 
franchise, its level of descriptive representation, its financial resources, and the 
enactment of policies protecting it, as the essence of political strength.21 On none 
                                                                                                                         
7 See id. at 1880 (gays are victims of more than 70% of hate-inspired murders). 
8 See id. at 1552 (success rate of anti-gay initiatives was close to 100% in marriage area, and about 70% in 
other areas). 
9 See id. at 1545 (29 of 50 states lack any anti-discrimination provisions for gays). 
10 See id. at 2414. 
11 See id. at 2414-2715. 
12 See id. at 2480 (“I see sort of a trajectory of increasing success and power by the LGBT-rights 
movement.”). 
13 See id. at 2438 (opponents of Proposition 8 raised and spent $43 million).  
14 See id. at 2448-53. 
15 See id. at 2455-68. 
16 See id. at 2470-71 (59 of 62 candidates by Equality California won in 2008). 
17 See id. at 2478-79. 
18 Impressively, more than 600 of the trial’s 3000 or so transcript pages were devoted to the issue of gays’ 
political power. 
19 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973) (one of “traditional indicia 
of suspectness” is whether group is “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”). 
20 See supra notes 5-9, 13-17. 
21 See infra Section I.A. The lower courts have been even less consistent in their analyses of 
powerlessness. See id. 
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of these occasions has the Court sketched any kind of theory that might explain 
why power should be understood one way rather than another.22 
Nor have scholars stepped into the breach. They have added a few candidates 
to the definitional mix—whether a group’s agenda is supported by public 
opinion, whether a group succeeds in repealing adverse legislation, whether a 
group is socioeconomically advantaged, etc.—but have failed to arrive at 
anything resembling a consensus.23 They also have failed to provide much 
theoretical ballast for the powerlessness doctrine. The point that a group can be 
deemed powerless only if we have an account of what power is for equal 
protection purposes seems largely to have been missed.24 
This conceptual confusion is both surprising and troubling. It is surprising 
because, forty years after the factor was introduced,25 one might expect courts 
and scholars to have worked out what powerlessness means and how it relates to 
democratic theory. And the trouble with the current state of affairs is that it 
produces scenes like the one in the Proposition 8 trial: rival experts testifying for 
days about what power might or might not entail, neither having any reason to 
privilege any one definition over any other.26 This is no way for law to operate. 
Litigants, judges, and academics alike need guidance in determining how much 
influence a group enjoys—and so whether the case for extra judicial attention is 
bolstered or undercut. Without such guidance, the hole at the heart of equal 
protection law will remain. 
My first goal in this Article, then, is to offer a definition of political 
powerlessness that makes theoretical sense. The definition I recommend is as 
follows: A group is relatively powerless if its aggregate policy preferences are 
less likely to be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups. 
Where does this definition come from? A multistage argument explains its 
provenance (and its content). 
First, the powerlessness factor stems from the third paragraph of Carolene 
Products’s famous fourth footnote.27 In relevant part, this paragraph states that 
“more searching judicial inquiry” may be needed when the “operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” is 
“curtail[ed].”28 It states, that is, that heightened scrutiny may apply when a 
minority wields less power than it would if the political system were functioning 
properly. Second, the mechanism that typically is thought to protect minorities is, 
in a word, pluralism. If innumerable groups endlessly are forming and breaking 
                                                 
22 See id. 
23 See infra Section I.B. 
24 See id. 
25 The Court’s first reference to political powerlessness came in San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973). 
26 Similar scenes unfolded in the proceedings in, among others, Pedersen v. Office of Personal 
Management, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327-32 (D. Conn. 2012) (discussing expert testimony on gays’ political 
power), Evans v. Romer, 1993 WL 518586, at *11 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) (same), and Equality 
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 425-26 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (same). 
27 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
28 Id. 
                                               Political Powerlessness   4 
 
alliances as they jockey for advantage, then each group sometimes will find itself 
in the majority. No group will be a perennial loser if the winning coalition is 
reshuffled on each issue. And third, pluralism does not always work as intended. 
Sometimes a group is unable to cut deals with its counterparts, and so ends up 
being outvoted on item after item. It is precisely in this situation, when a group 
loses unexpectedly often, that the group is relatively powerless. 
The pluralist roots of powerlessness account for each element of my 
proposed definition. Why deem the enactment of preferred policies the crux of a 
group’s power? Because pluralism promises each group a chance to win, not 
merely to play the game. Why consider policies in the aggregate rather than 
individual issues? Because no group in the pluralist competition is entitled to 
prevail on any particular matter. Why control for a group’s size when assessing 
its power? Because size matters; all else being equal, a larger group is more 
likely to end up in the majority. Why also control for classification type? To 
avoid comparing apples (e.g., the political power of gays) to oranges (e.g., that of 
blacks). And why conceive of powerlessness as a matter of degree? For the sake 
of accuracy. Power waxes and wanes; it does not turn on and off. 
As soon as powerlessness is linked to pluralist theory, it becomes clear why 
other definitions of the term are flawed. If policy enactment is the essence of 
power, then a verdict of powerlessness cannot be avoided simply because a 
group’s members are free to vote, are affluent, or are descriptively represented 
(to name some prominent alternatives). Participation, affluence, and 
representation undoubtedly are correlated with policy enactment. But they are no 
guarantee of it, and it is winning that matters under pluralism, not exhibiting 
some common traits of winners. Similarly, the passage of measures protecting a 
group (such as anti-discrimination laws) is not proof that the group is strong 
enough that judicial involvement is unnecessary. It remains possible that the 
group loses on most other matters. Individual victories might conceal aggregate 
defeats. 
In addition to defining powerlessness, I aim in this Article to begin grappling 
with the fascinating conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional issues that it 
implicates. Several of these issues are meaty enough to warrant papers of their 
own, so my discussion necessarily is suggestive rather than dispositive. In the 
interest of space, I also flag only three of the issues now, and leave the rest for 
later.  
First, does it matter what the reason is for a group’s powerlessness? 
Carolene asserted that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” is the 
principal cause of pluralist malfunction.29 But scholars have subjected this claim 
to withering critique,30 while also identifying many other factors that may 
account for a group’s lack of influence: its diffuseness and anonymity, its low 
level of civic engagement, its dearth of resources, its support for a losing political 
party, and so on.31 So what happens if a group is powerless but not for the reason 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). 
31 See infra Section II.C.1. 
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that Carolene envisioned? My tentative answer is that the case for heightened 
scrutiny should remain intact. There still has been a pluralist breakdown even if 
the breakdown is attributable to other causes. Indeed, the powerlessness doctrine 
should be commended for transcending Carolene’s “bad political science”32—for 
focusing on the reality of malfunction rather than its explanation.  
Second, is it possible to reconcile the inquiry into powerlessness with the rest 
of equal protection law? The Court has made clear that it subscribes to an anti-
differentiation theory that subjects to more stringent review laws that distinguish 
among people on certain grounds.33 But powerlessness sounds not in anti-
differentiation but rather in its great rival, anti-subordination.34 To ask if a group 
lacks political influence is close to asking if the group is politically subordinated. 
In fact, to talk of classes at all (instead of classifications) is to venture onto thin 
legal ice. This tension is very real, and it may mean that the Court someday will 
eliminate the powerlessness factor. For the time being, though, the factor’s 
continued existence suggests that the Court’s embrace of the anti-differentiation 
theory is incomplete. Apparently, the Court cannot bring itself (as the theory 
would require) to excise politics entirely from its equal protection analysis. 
And third, are courts even capable of telling whether a group is powerless? 
Under my definition, courts would need to assess the likelihood that a group’s 
aggregate policy preferences will be enacted, controlling for the group’s size and 
type. Is this a feasible judicial inquiry? Or, as Justice Powell once wrote about 
another of the factors relevant to suspect status, a history of discrimination, is 
there “no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit ‘heightened 
judicial solicitude’ and which would not”?35 I think there is a principled basis for 
measuring groups’ political power, and my final goal in this Article is to 
substantiate this claim empirically. 
I try to do so, first, by surveying the existing political science literature. 
Scholars have found, for example, that blacks and Hispanics are less likely than 
whites to have their preferences heeded with respect to levels of federal 
spending.36 The voting records of members of Congress also are less responsive 
to blacks’ and Hispanics’ views, even taking group size into account.37 Both 
members of Congress and state representatives are less responsive to the opinions 
of the poor as well, again controlling for group size.38 The poor have less sway 
too over federal and state policy outcomes.39 On the other hand, women are 
                                                 
32 Ackerman, supra note 30, at 743. 
33 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (“It 
is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial 
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”). I call this theory “anti-differentiation” rather than 
“anti-discrimination” or “anti-classification” to avoid confusing it with anti-discrimination laws or suspect 
classifications. 
34 The canonical work on the anti-subordination theory remains Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1976). 
35 Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
36 See infra Section III.A. 
37 See id. 
38 See infra Section III.D. 
39 See id. 
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almost as ideologically close to their House members as are men (though gender 
proximity does vary by member party).40 And while there is little survey data on 
gays’ own preferences, it takes more than majority support in the whole 
population before pro-gay policies are likely to become law.41 
Alas, while very interesting, most of the existing literature is deficient for my 
purposes. The problem is that little of it both examines policy enactment and 
controls for group size. For instance, the work on minority preferences and 
federal spending ignores the magnitude of each minority group. So does the work 
on the adoption of pro-gay policies, while also considering just a handful of items 
instead of the entire issue universe. And all of the studies of legislators’ 
responsiveness and proximity to their constituents pertain to representation, 
which has only a tenuous link to actual policy.  
I thought it necessary, then, to carry out my own empirical analysis to show 
that powerlessness is amenable to measurement. At the federal level, I obtained 
access to a database recently compiled by Martin Gilens that includes responses 
to more than 2,000 survey questions over the 1981-2006 period, as well as 
information on whether the policy asked about by each question was enacted 
during the ensuing four years.42 Using this data, I replicated the models that 
Gilens ran for different income groups, but for different races, genders, and 
religions. Controlling for group size, I found that whites’ preferences are more 
likely to be adopted by the national government than racial minorities’; that 
men’s views are more impactful than women’s; and that all denominations’ 
opinions are about equally influential.43 
At the state level, I used exit polls from 2000 to 2010, including more than 
300,000 respondents, to determine the average ideology of different groups in 
each state.44 I also relied on an index of state policy liberalism, spanning over 
200 distinct issues, recently assembled by Jason Sorens.45 These datasets enabled 
me to run essentially the same models as at the federal level, only this time for a 
wider range of groups thanks to the exit polls’ greater coverage. Controlling for 
group size, I again found that state policy outcomes are more responsive to the 
preferences of whites and men than to those of racial minorities and women.46 I 
also found that policy outcomes are more responsive to the wealthy and the 
middle-class than to the poor; more responsive to urban and suburban residents 
                                                 
40 See infra Section III.B. 
41 See infra Section III.C. 
42 See Economic Inequality and Political Representation, RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, 
http://www.russellsage.org/research/data/economic-inequality-and-political-representation (last visited Feb. 1, 
2015). The book that Gilens wrote based on this data is one of a handful of studies directly measuring 
powerlessness (as I define it). See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).  
43 See infra Section IV.A. 
44 The Roper Center generously gave me access to its state exit poll archive. See State Election Day Exit 
Polls 1978-2010, ROPER CTR. PUB. OPINION ARCHIVES, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/common/ 
state_exitpolls.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Exit Poll Database]. 
45 See Data, STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.statepolicyindex.com/the-research/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Sorens Database]. 
46 See infra Section IV.B. 
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than to rural dwellers; and about equally responsive to all age, education, and 
religion groups.47  
These results are good evidence that powerlessness can be measured reliably. 
The consistency of the federal and state analyses, despite the use of completely 
different data, is especially encouraging. But the results are not just 
methodologically significant. They also assist in answering the crucial 
substantive question of which groups should be deemed suspect classes. The case 
for racial minorities and women—groups already recognized by the Court48—
becomes stronger given their meager influence on policy enactment. The case 
against heightened protection for any age groups (also a result consistent with 
Court precedent49) becomes more persuasive as well. But, at least on grounds of 
clout, the poor have a compelling claim to suspect status. Their policy 
preferences are less likely to be realized than those of other income groups, at 
both the federal and state levels. The Court’s holdings to the contrary50 are in 
tension with political reality. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe the conceptual 
confusion that mars the powerlessness doctrine. This confusion is evident in both 
judges and academics, and stems from their failure to connect the doctrine to its 
pluralist roots. In Part II, the Article’s theoretical core, I offer a definition of 
powerlessness that is derived explicitly from pluralist theory. I also criticize other 
definitions and begin coming to terms with the doctrine’s many intriguing 
implications. In Part III, I examine the existing empirics on powerlessness. While 
there are several helpful studies, most of the literature does not directly capture 
the concept. Finally, in Part IV, I conduct my own empirical analysis of 
powerlessness. Using a series of recently compiled datasets, I show that 
powerlessness indeed can be measured and then usefully applied. 
Two last introductory points: First, as important as what this Article does is 
what it does not do. I do not provide an account of how powerlessness relates to 
the ultimate determination of suspect class status (though I note some 
possibilities). I also do not advance a general model of equal protection (though I 
do not hide my theoretical preferences). My more modest aims are simply to 
define powerlessness sensibly and then to apply my definition empirically. These 
strike me as quite enough for a single project. 
And second, the powerlessness factor is not some dusty relic of the New 
Deal or Warren Courts. Rather, its legal significance has never been greater than 
it is today. Of all the cases ever to analyze it, close to half have been decided 
since 2000.51 The vast majority of scholarship on the subject has been published 
                                                 
47 See id. 
48 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (gender); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) 
(race). However, as explained later, the case for blacks is substantially stronger than that for Hispanics. See 
infra Section IV.C. 
49 See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). 
50 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
51 According to a Westlaw search conducted on January 15, 2015, 184 of the 501 cases to examine 
political powerlessness date from after 2000. 
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in the same period.52 And perhaps the most common argument made by 
defendants in perhaps our era’s highest-profile equal protection cases—those 
involving gay rights—is that gays wield enough influence that courts need not 
intervene to protect them.53 There is some urgency, then, to the task of figuring 
out what exactly powerlessness is, and who exactly counts as powerless.54 
 
I.  CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION 
 
The powerlessness doctrine has been around for a long time. Its underlying 
theory was articulated in Carolene, decided in 1938,55 and its explicit 
announcement came in the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez. “[T]he traditional indicia of suspectness,” declared the Court, 
include whether a group is “relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process.”56 
One might think that courts and scholars would have settled on the meaning 
of powerlessness in the forty-odd years since Rodriguez. But one would be 
wrong. In fact, as I explain in this Part, judges and academics have offered 
widely diverging definitions of group influence, ranging from access to the 
franchise to descriptive representation to the passage of protective legislation. 
What accounts for this conceptual muddle? As to courts, I think the answer is 
their tendency to analyze powerlessness in the abstract, without considering the 
pluralist theory from which it arises. As to scholars, the most likely explanation 
is their distraction by bigger game, such as whether there should be a 
powerlessness factor in the first place. 
 
A. Courts 
 
Since Rodriguez, the full Court or individual Justices have advanced at least 
five separate conceptions of powerlessness, all of which have found adherents 
among the lower courts. I arrange these conceptions here according to their 
stringency, beginning with the ones furthest removed from actual policy 
                                                 
52 I discuss this scholarship in Section I.B, infra. 
53 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 4359059, at *19 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014); Pedersen 
v. Office of Personal Management, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329 (D. Conn. 2012); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 
882 (N.M. 2013) (“Focusing on the political powerlessness prong is a reasonable strategy for the opponents of 
same-gender marriage . . . .”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for 
Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2010) (“The most popular strategy by 
defenders of ‘traditional marriage’ . . . has been that gay people are not politically powerless . . . .”). 
54 See Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the 
Poor, 104 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 16) (“[T]he controversy over the proper measure of 
political power is not likely to go away anytime soon.”). 
55 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
56 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Of course, it is quite ironic that the 
powerlessness doctrine was announced in a decision that was so hostile to its use to provide heightened 
protection to the poor. The doctrine’s roots also stretch all the way back to Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1879). See id. at 306 (noting that African Americans “need[] the protection which a wise government 
extends to those who are unable to protect themselves”). 
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enactment. I also focus on the Court’s reasoning and consign most of the lower 
courts’ analyses to the margins. 
First, certain Justices have equated a group’s political strength with its 
numerical size. In a 1989 case, Justice Marshall argued that the “numerical . . . 
supremacy of a given racial group is a factor bearing upon the level of scrutiny to 
be applied,”57 while in a 1996 case, Justice Scalia contended that women cannot 
be powerless “when they constitute a majority of the electorate.”58 Several lower 
courts have echoed these views in gay rights cases, claiming that gays lack 
influence because they “make up only a small percentage of the population.”59 
Second, in its cases conferring suspect status to aliens, the Court has treated 
the right to vote as the linchpin of political power. Aliens allegedly are powerless 
because they “are not entitled to vote,”60 “have no direct voice in the political 
processes,”61 and are “formally and completely barred from participating in the 
process of self-government.”62 Following the Court’s lead, a few lower courts 
have emphasized access to the franchise in cases involving juveniles63 and the 
poor.64 
Third, in a 1973 decision suggesting that gender classifications might be 
subject to strict scrutiny, a plurality of the Justices defined power in terms of 
descriptive representation.65 Women lacked clout because they were “vastly 
underrepresented in this Nation’s decisionmaking councils . . . throughout all 
levels of our State and Federal Government.”66 Several lower courts’ discussions 
of gays’ influence have proceeded along similar lines. Typically, these courts 
have concluded that gays are powerless due to the “underrepresentation of gays 
and lesbians in political office.”67 On one occasion, though, a magazine story 
“that one congressman is an avowed homosexual, and that there is a charge that 
                                                 
57 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 553 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to 
blacks in Richmond, Virginia). 
58 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
59 Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1014 (W.D. Wisc. 2014); see also, e.g., Love v. Beshear, 989 F. 
Supp. 2d 536, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 950 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“[G]ays 
and lesbians constitute a minority that lacks significant political power.”). 
60 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976). 
61 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978). 
62 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Minors cannot vote and thus might be considered politically powerless to an extreme 
degree.”). 
63 See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that juveniles “lack the right to 
vote” and have no “independent voice in legislative decisionmaking”). 
64 See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022 n.19 (Colo. 1982) (contrasting poor, who 
are free to vote, with situations in which “a racial minority group was effectively excluded from equal 
participation in the political process”). 
65 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
66 Id.; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 514 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing against 
Mexican American powerlessness in county where “a majority of the elected officials . . . were Mexican-
American, as were a majority of the judges”). 
67 Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (S.D. Ohio 2013); see also, e.g., Watkins v. United 
States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment); Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 446 (Conn. 2008) (“[O]f the more than one-half million people who 
hold a political office at the local, state and national level, only about 300 are openly gay persons.”); Griego v. 
Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 882 (N.M. 2013). 
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five other top officials are known to be homosexual” led to a determination that 
“[h]omosexuals are not without political power.”68 
Fourth, in a 1996 case, Justice Scalia asserted that affluence is the essence of 
influence.69 Because gays “have high disposable income,” “they possess political 
power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide.”70 At least 
one lower court has taken the same tack, though it deemed gays a suspect class 
after finding that “homosexuals earn an income roughly equal to that of the 
national average.”71 
And fifth, in the 1985 case that prompted the Court’s most extended 
commentary on powerlessness, it stressed the enactment of protective 
legislation.72 “[T]he legislative response” to the condition of the mentally 
handicapped, which includes a range of beneficial federal laws, “negates any 
claim that [they] are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to 
attract the attention of the lawmakers.”73 Some lower courts have seized on this 
language to deny gays’ claims to suspect status. They have reasoned that gays 
indeed are able to attract lawmakers’ attention, as evidenced by the pro-gay 
measures that certain jurisdictions have adopted.74 Other courts have paid heed 
not just to gays’ victories but also to their defeats. They usually have determined 
that the losses outnumber the wins, meaning that a judgment of powerlessness is 
warranted.75 And still other courts have broadened the inquiry and asked whether 
gays are able to end discrimination against them through the political process. 
Their answer most often has been negative, leading to their conclusion that gays 
lack influence.76 
                                                 
68 Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); see also Sevcik v. 
Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1008 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d, Latta v. Otter, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 4977682 
(Oct. 7, 2014) (concluding that gays are not powerless after observing that “[h]omosexuals serve openly in 
federal and state political offices”). 
69 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (also noting gays’ geographic 
concentration and greater preference intensity on gay rights issues). 
70 Id. 
71 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 438 (S.D. Ohio 1994), 
rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). 
72 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985). 
73 Id.; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “a 
long list of legislation proves the proposition [that women are powerless] false”); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 
361, 375 n.14 (1974) (citing “solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for conscientious objectors” as 
reason not to deem them powerless (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
74 See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 611 (Md. App. 2007) (noting gays’ “growing successes in the legislative and 
executive branches of government”); Andersen v. King Cty., 139 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (citing 
“enactment of provisions providing increased protections to gay and lesbian individuals”). 
75 See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 439 (observing that gay “victories are being ‘rolled back’ at an unprecedented 
rate and in an unprecedented manner”); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d, 976 F.2d 
623 (10th Cir. 1992) (criticizing position that “scattered, piecemeal successes in local legislation are proof of 
political power”). 
76 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
(“The question is not whether homosexuals have achieved political successes over the years; they clearly have. 
The question is whether they have the strength to politically protect themselves from wrongful 
discrimination.”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 444 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009). For a longer discussion of how lower courts have dealt with the passage of some 
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The crucial point about these definitions is that they are entirely inconsistent 
with one other. Gays may be a small and underrepresented minority frequently 
targeted by hostile legislation (implying powerlessness), but they also vote freely, 
enjoy reasonable affluence, and win some policy battles (implying power). 
Similarly, blacks seem weak if their population share and income are 
emphasized, but quite potent if the spotlight shifts to their access to the franchise, 
descriptive representation, and success in passing anti-discrimination and 
affirmative action laws. Grappling with these difficulties, lower courts often have 
complained that “the Supreme Court has no more than made passing reference to 
the ‘political power’ factor without ever actually analyzing it,”77 and that “the 
Court has never defined what it means to be politically powerless.”78 Scholars 
have bemoaned the absence of doctrinal clarity in similar terms.79 
What explains this confusion? Why have courts not settled on a single 
conception of group influence? The most likely answer, in my view, is the 
tendency of judges steeped in the common law system to apply doctrinal tests 
without reflecting much on their origins. Take the Connecticut Supreme Court, 
whose 2008 disquisition on powerlessness remains the most detailed and 
thoughtful of any judicial body.80 The court began by noting that powerlessness 
need not be absolute since blacks and women, both suspect classes, have at least 
some political clout.81 The court then announced its definition of powerlessness: 
“whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end to the 
prejudice and discrimination through traditional political means.”82 Next the 
court recited several factors that convinced it that gays lack such strength: the 
intensity of the hostility against them, the scarcity of openly gay legislators, the 
limits of the protective measures already on the books, and so on.83 Finally, the 
court argued that whatever influence gays wield, it is less than that of blacks and 
women, meaning that they too must be deemed powerless.84 
Entirely missing from this analysis was any consideration of why the 
powerlessness doctrine exists in the first place. The court did not connect the 
                                                                                                                         
pro-gay policies, see Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the 
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1381-90 (2011). 
77 Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 437 n.17. 
78 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893; see also, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Personal Management, 881 F. Supp. 
2d 294, 328 (D. Conn. 2012) (commenting on “ill-defined nature of this factor”); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 441. 
79 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal 
Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 979 (2014); Schacter, supra note 76, at 1392 
n.192 (referring to Court’s “pronouncements” on powerlessness as “scattered, scant and inconsistent”); Kenji 
Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 
1793 (1996) (“[C]ourts have struggled to determine the appropriate indicia of political powerlessness.”). 
80 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440-61; see also Schacter, supra note 76, at 1383 (describing court’s analysis 
as “most developed and extended”). As I discuss in the Conclusion, infra, Schacter’s explanation for the 
doctrinal confusion is different from mine. She thinks political process theory itself is to blame. See id. at 1390-
1402. 
81 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440-44. 
82 Id. at 444. 
83 See id. at 444-52. 
84 See id. at 452-54. 
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doctrine to Carolene.85 Nor did it mention the pluralist theory that offers at least 
one solution to the puzzle of how much influence minorities should wield in a 
democracy. Nor did it cite the political process approach associated most closely 
with John Hart Ely.86 Instead, the court treated the words political powerlessness 
as if they were written in a vacuum, devoid of any theoretical foundation, open to 
whatever interpretation judges might give to them. It is no surprise that this mode 
of reasoning, repeated by many courts over many cases,87 gives rise to 
irreconcilable notions of power. Power is a coherent concept only if it is 
perceived through a theoretical prism. 
This critique of the Connecticut Supreme Court applies even more strongly 
to the United States Supreme Court. In the half dozen or so cases in which the 
full Court has examined the powerlessness factor explicitly, it never has linked it 
to any kind of democratic theory.88 Instead, the Court has tended to quote the 
factor’s language, to invoke one or another conception of influence—and then to 
move quickly to other matters.89 It is true that the Court, as the ultimate expositor 
of equal protection law, might have reasons beyond common law instinct for 
declining to define powerlessness more clearly. It might worry that a crisper 
definition (indeed, any definition at all) would push the law in unwanted 
directions. I address the potentially unsettling implications of the powerlessness 
doctrine later in the Article.90 But next, I turn to the academic literature to see if 
scholars have done a better job than courts in ascertaining what the doctrine 
means. 
 
B. Scholars 
 
The short answer is no. In their works on powerlessness, scholars mostly 
have reiterated the standards already set forth by courts. While they have 
tweaked the judicial tests in various ways, they have not come to any consensus 
on the meaning of group influence. In fact, almost exactly the same cleavages 
that appear in the doctrine are evident in the relevant scholarship as well. 
Take a group’s numerical size (the first of the judicial definitions). Owen 
Fiss has argued that blacks are powerless because “they are a numerical 
                                                 
85 The court cited Carolene only for the proposition that “discrete and insular” minorities might require 
heightened judicial protection. See id. at 439. 
86 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
87 For some of the very few court decisions to approach powerlessness from a more theoretical 
perspective, see Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 438 (S.D. 
Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing pluralist theory), and Dean v. District of Columbia, 
653 A.2d 307, 349 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Finally, there is the 
question drawn directly from Carolene Products: whether gays and lesbians are a politically powerless 
minority.”). 
88 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
445 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
313 (1976); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 
n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
89 See id. 
90 See infra Section II.C. 
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minority,”91 while Michael Klarman has advocated the opposite conclusion for 
women because they are a “slight majority of the eligible voting population.”92 
Or consider a group’s access to the franchise (the second judicial definition). 
William Eskridge has contended that after “people of color started voting” and 
“women gained formal access to the political process,” “it was not clear what 
more a referee Court should do.”93 
Likewise, a group’s descriptive representation (the third definition) takes 
pride of place in the work of Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey94 and Suzanna 
Sherry.95 Sherry has written that “heightened scrutiny would be appropriate” if “a 
discriminatory decision is made by a political body in which [a group is] 
underrepresented.”96 A group’s socioeconomic status (the fourth definition) is the 
core of Kenji Yoshino’s conception of influence.97 Three of his “factors that can 
influence a group’s political power” are “the group’s income and wealth,” “its 
education level,” and “its social position.”98 And the passage of protective 
legislation (the fifth definition) is endorsed by Eskridge in another piece99 as well 
as by Marcy Strauss.100 Strauss has put the point nicely: “Political powerlessness 
refers to a group’s inability to rely on the legislative process to protect its 
interests.”101 
Scholars, then, are just as conflicted as courts on the meaning of 
powerlessness. How come? As before, I think one explanation is the temptation 
(which is not limited to judges) to focus on doctrine at the expense of theory. 
Several of the relevant articles dive into definitional issues without pausing to 
consider what broader values the powerlessness factor might aim to realize.102 
                                                 
91 Fiss, supra note 34, at 151 (also citing blacks’ economic condition and prejudice against them). 
92 Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 751 
(1991) (also noting that women are “fully enfranchised”). 
93 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2379 (2002). 
94 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action 
and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685, 705 (1991) (commenting that “[a]lthough 
political influence is virtually impossible to measure, political representation is not”). 
95 See Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, 
and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 123 (1984). 
96 Id. 
97 See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case 
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 565 (1998). 
98 Id. (also recommending group’s “health and longevity,” “its freedom from public and private violence,” 
“its ability to exercise its political rights,” and “the acceptability of prejudice against the group”).  
99 See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 5 (describing political power as group’s ability to “resist or repeal these 
unjust discriminatory laws”). 
100 See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 153 (2011). 
101 Id. For still more conceptions of powerlessness, see ELY, supra note 86, at 152 (arguing that blacks are 
not powerless because they supported winning presidential candidate in 1976), Hutchinson, supra note 79, at 
1003-04, 1028 (offering definition centered on whether public opinion favors group’s agenda), and Daniel R. 
Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 734 (1991) 
(claiming that group has sufficient power when legislature “address[es] a group’s concerns appropriately”). And 
in a valuable recent addition to the powerlessness literature, Ross and Li have advocated a “more holistic 
approach to determining whether a group has political power” that encompasses all of the factors previously 
identified by courts. Ross & Li, supra note 54 (manuscript at 5). 
102 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 79, at 1028 (proposing definition based only on various factors that 
political scientists have measured); Strauss, supra note 100, at 153 (proposing definition without any prelude at 
all). For a notable exception, see generally Schacter, supra note 76. 
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Another reason probably is academic self-interest. A scholar makes few waves 
by agreeing with existing positions. Professional incentives encourage 
differentiation.103 
But the most likely answer, in my view, is simply that the literature has 
focused on tasks other than defining group influence. In particular, most scholars 
have sought either to assess the normative desirability of the powerlessness 
factor, to explain why certain groups but not others are deemed powerless, or to 
examine how the factor relates to the other suspect class criteria. Eskridge104 and 
Jane Schacter,105 for instance, have argued that powerlessness should be 
eliminated as an independent criterion for suspect status. Similarly, Eskridge,106 
Schacter,107 and Yoshino108 have observed a paradox by which courts dub 
powerful groups as powerless and powerless groups as powerful. And Richard 
Levy,109 Daniel Ortiz,110 and Yoshino111 have stressed the oddity of employing 
some factors that reflect anti-differentiation theory and others that sound in anti-
subordination. It is no great shock that a consistent conception of powerlessness 
has failed to emerge from such diverse academic projects. 
Ultimately, the reasons for courts’ and scholars’ confusion are not terribly 
important. The key points are that there is sharp disagreement over the meaning 
of powerlessness—and that the disagreement matters because it makes it almost 
impossible to tell whether a group does or does not qualify as powerless. In the 
next Part, I try my hand at clearing the fog that shrouds this area of law. I try, that 
is, to offer a definition of powerlessness that makes theoretical sense, and to 
show that other definitions are theoretically lacking. 
 
II.  PLURALISM AND POWER 
 
The definition I propose is this: A group is relatively powerless if its 
aggregate policy preferences are less likely to be enacted than those of similarly 
sized and classified groups. I explain, first, how this definition stems from the 
pluralist theory that underpins Carolene. The theory claims that, in a properly 
functioning political system, groups of about the same size and type should have 
about the same odds of getting their preferred policies enacted. So if a group’s 
odds actually are much lower than its peers’, then the system is not working 
properly, and the group is relatively powerless. 
                                                 
103 I am aware that this point applies to this Article too. 
104 See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 20. 
105 See Schacter, supra note 76, at 1403 (“[T]he powerlessness criterion might be better conceptualized as 
something to be assessed . . . as an aspect of past discrimination . . . .”). 
106 See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 17-19. 
107 See Schacter, supra note 76, at 1397-1402. 
108 See Kenji Yoshino, The Paradox of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme Court, 2012 
UTAH L. REV. 527, 541 (2012) (“A group must have an immense amount of political power before it will be 
deemed politically powerless by the Court.”). 
109 See Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 38-52 (2010). 
110 See Ortiz, supra note 101, at 732 (“[T]he Court's overall approach to identifying suspect and quasi-
suspect classifications appears highly schizophrenic.”). 
111 See Yoshino, supra note 97, at 563-64. 
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I then contend that other definitions of powerlessness are deficient from a 
pluralist perspective. The trouble with numerical size, access to the franchise, 
descriptive representation, and socioeconomic status is the same: None of these 
options zeroes in on policy enactment itself (as opposed to one of its potential 
causes). The passage of protective legislation comes closer to the mark. But the 
approach still is flawed because it considers only a small subset of all the issues 
that make up the pluralist marketplace. 
Lastly, I begin exploring the many fascinating implications of the 
powerlessness doctrine. As to powerlessness itself, I discuss whether the reasons 
for it matter (I think not); and whether influence can vary over time and space 
(absolutely). As to the doctrine’s legal fit, I address its relationship to the other 
suspect class criteria (awkward); its relationship to equal protection law as a 
whole (also uneasy); and the status of the pluralist theory on which it rests 
(questionable). And as to the courts that are responsible for implementing the 
doctrine, I comment on their capacity to do so given their political and 
psychological constraints (comparatively high); and their ability to determine 
powerlessness in the first place (improving). 
 
A. From Theory to Meaning 
 
The case for my proposed definition of powerlessness has several steps. 
Below, I go through these steps and then show how each element of the 
definition follows from pluralist theory. 
 
1. Pluralist Hopes and Fears 
 
The first key point about the powerlessness factor is that it is derived 
explicitly from the third paragraph of Carolene’s legendary fourth footnote. If 
“those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” are 
“curtail[ed],” then minorities have less influence than they would if the 
“processes” were operating properly.112 They are relatively powerless compared 
to the “ordinar[]y” situation in which their interests are “protect[ed].”113 This 
linkage occasionally has caught the Supreme Court’s eye.114 It also has been 
recognized by several scholars. Yoshino, for example, has observed that “[t]he 
conventional wisdom that courts should not protect groups with sufficient 
political power dates back [to Carolene].”115 
                                                 
112 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
113 Id. 
114 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 
1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (connecting concern “for a discrete class’s political powerlessness” to 
“the moment the Court began constructing modern equal protection doctrine in [Carolene]”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982). 
115 Yoshino, supra note 108, at 537; see also, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 80 (1999) (noting 
that powerlessness factor “flows logically from the Carolene Products rationale for suspect classes”); Levy, 
supra note 109, at 38. 
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Second, the mechanism that typically is thought to protect minorities is, in 
short, pluralism. The Court, atheoretical as ever, has never said so outright.116 
But pluralism is one of the great theories of American democracy,117 and it was 
especially ascendant when Carolene was decided in the 1930s. As political 
scientists Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech have written, the approach was 
“the central framework of analysis during the first sixty years of [the twentieth] 
century.”118 Because of this intellectual dominance—and because it is hard to 
come up with other democratic theories in which minorities play a central role—
there is little academic disagreement that Carolene’s “political processes” refer to 
pluralism.119 In Edwin Baker’s words, “The image of the democratic process that 
is most consistent with [Carolene’s] footnote . . . . is pluralistic democratic 
theory[].”120 
Third, while there exist several variants of pluralism,121 all of them share the 
following core logic: The population is divided into innumerable groups, none 
amounting to a majority, by myriad crosscutting and overlapping cleavages.122 
Public policy emerges as these groups continuously compete and bargain with 
one another to advance their respective interests.123 The makeup of the winning 
coalition shifts from issue to issue as the groups recurrently form and break 
alliances.124 It thus is impossible to speak of “majority rule” since there is no 
                                                 
116 Though lower courts occasionally have. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of 
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 438 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (“All groups are a 
minority on specific issues, and thus all groups must form coalitions in order to obtain beneficial legislation.”). 
117 See Bruce E. Cain, Democracy More or Less: The Quandary of American Political Reform 12 (2014) 
(referring to pluralism as one of “three major reform traditions in the U.S.”). 
118 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN 
POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 48 (1998); see also, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN 
PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 21 (1960) (describing ascendance of “‘group’ theories 
of politics” during “first third of the twentieth century”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: 
Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Protection of Politics, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1565, 1610 (2013). 
119 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
120 C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 
TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1036 (1980); see also, e.g., ELY, supra note 86, at 80 (claiming even more broadly that the 
entire “Constitution’s more pervasive strategy . . . can be loosely styled a strategy of pluralism”); Ackerman, 
supra note 30, at 719 (noting that “generations of [scholars] have filled in the picture of pluralist democracy 
presupposed by Carolene’s distinctive argument for minority rights”). Of course, there are other plausible 
readings of Carolene (especially its second paragraph) as well. My claim is only that the pluralistic reading is a 
common and intuitive one. 
121 See, e.g., John F. Manley, Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II, 77 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 368, 368-69 (1983) (contrasting conventional “pluralism I” with more pessimistic “pluralism 
II”). 
122 See, e.g., ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 207 (1967) (noting that “we get a great 
confusion of the groups” when “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of planes [representing cleavages] are passed 
through the sphere [representing the public]”); ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 369 (1967); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC 
OPINION 508 (1951). 
123 See, e.g., BENTLEY, supra note 122, at 260; V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 
165-66 (4th ed., 1958) (“Much public policy emerges from . . . friction, attrition, and agreement among 
groups.”); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 376, 390 
(1952). 
124 See, e.g., NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 115 (1963); Nicholas R. 
Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 737 (1983) (“In the absence of a majority 
preference cluster, political outcomes are brought about by shifting coalitions of smaller clusters.”); Ross, supra 
note 118, at 1580. 
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single majority that remains constant across areas and over time.125 Instead, 
public policy is the product of “minorities rule”—the particular combination of 
groups that manages to prevail on a given matter.126 
Fourth, minorities usually are protected in a pluralist system because they 
usually have decent odds of getting (at least some of) their preferred policies 
enacted. True, there is no guarantee that any group will end up on the winning 
side of any individual dispute.127 But, as alliances endlessly come together and 
then come undone, any group that is willing to engage in “wheeling and dealing,” 
in Ely’s phrase, sometimes should find itself in the majority.128 Why? In part 
because of sheer chance; in a world of ever-changing issues and cleavages, no 
group should be a perennial winner or loser.129 But also because each group 
controls valuable resources that give it leverage as it negotiates with its 
counterparts—above all, the votes that are needed to assemble legislative 
majorities.130 It is for these reasons that Robert Dahl, a leading pluralist theorist, 
has claimed that “few groups . . . who are determined to influence the 
government . . . lack the capacity and opportunity . . . to obtain at least some of 
their goals.”131 
And fifth, the pluralist safeguards for minorities do not always work. 
Sometimes a group finds itself losing on issue after issue, unable time and again 
to break into the majority.132 Chance alone cannot produce such a dismal record; 
the flip of the coalitional coin cannot always come out wrong. Persistent defeats 
also are possible only if a group’s preferences are distinctive along several 
dimensions; otherwise the group’s views would overlap with the majority’s more 
often. But if a group does hold unusual positions, it can end up a perpetual loser 
in numerous ways. It might be less skilled than its opponents at the cut and parry 
of politics.133 It might be the victim of cleavages that are reinforcing rather than 
                                                 
125 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 128 (1956). 
126 Id. 
127 See Lewis F. Powell, Jr, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1982) (“The fact 
that one group is disadvantaged by a particular piece of legislation . . . does not prove that the process has failed 
to function properly.”). 
128 ELY, supra note 86, at 151. 
129 See, e.g., Latham, supra note 123, at 391 (“Today’s losers may be tomorrow’s winners.”); Mark 
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE 
L.J. 1037, 1052 (1980). 
130 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 720-22; Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in 
the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1302 (1982) (arguing that groups’ votes are “too desirable a 
plum to leave unplucked”). 
131 DAHL, supra note 122, at 386; see also, e.g., BENTLEY, supra note 122, at 271 (claiming that “[t]he 
lowest of despised castes . . . will still be found to be a factor in the government”). Dahl also has emphasized the 
highly complex structure of the American political system, which gives minorities many opportunities to block 
policies they oppose. See DAHL, supra note 122, at 326. Still another pluralist protection is the crosscutting 
nature of many cleavages, which encourages majorities to take into account minorities’ interests. See Bertrall L. 
Ross, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent Standard, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 213 (2012). 
132 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 86, at 152 (referring to a minority that is “barred from the pluralist’s 
bazaar”); Cover, supra note 130, at 1296. 
133 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 722-31 (explaining that diffuse and anonymous groups are less 
effective at promoting their interests); Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 107, 131 (1990). 
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crosscutting.134 Or it might be faced with other groups that steadfastly refuse to 
make deals with it.135 If any of these conditions are present, then the pluralist 
promise of (at least some) policy success turns out to be hollow. 
I doubt that this account of pluralism and group power would strike most 
equal protection scholars as especially original. It is, in essence, the argument 
that Ely first laid out a generation ago.136 But while the story may be familiar, its 
doctrinal implications are not. Next, I show how pluralist theory, if taken 
seriously, urges a particular—and quite novel—understanding of the 
powerlessness factor.  
 
2. Doctrinal Implications 
 
Recall the definition of powerlessness that I outlined above. It is useful to 
divide it into a series of components: A group is (1) relatively powerless if (2) its 
aggregate policy preferences (3) are less likely to be enacted (4) than those of 
similarly sized (5) and classified groups.137 Each of these elements proceeds 
logically from the pluralist vision that animates Carolene. 
Start with the point that a group must be only relatively (rather than 
absolutely) powerless in order to have a claim to suspect status.138 In a pluralist 
system, a group’s likelihood of ending up in a winning coalition can range from 
near-zero to near-certain. A group can bargain (or stumble) its way into the 
majority anywhere from almost never to almost always. Since a group’s odds of 
victory vary along a spectrum, so should any conception of a group’s power (or 
powerlessness). It makes little sense to collapse a continuous variable into a 
binary one.139 
                                                 
134 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 131, at 217. 
135 See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a 
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1013 (1987) (referring to “inability 
of some minorities to form coalitions with other groups”); David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1257. 
136 See generally ELY, supra note 86. Ely, however, followed Carolene’s lead in focusing on pluralist 
breakdowns caused by prejudice. 
137 And perhaps a sixth element should be added, for the meaning of group itself. By a group I mean a set 
of people who share a particular characteristic (either objective or subjective), and whose policy preferences 
have more in common than those of people chosen at random. By this definition, blacks clearly are a cognizable 
group, but short people probably are not, since despite their shared lack of height their views likely are no more 
consistent than those of randomly selected individuals. See Fiss, supra note 34, at 148-49 (advancing a similar 
definition of a social group). 
138 Most courts and scholars that have considered the matter have agreed that powerlessness should be 
analyzed in relative rather than absolute terms. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Personal Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 
294, 329 (D. Conn. 2012); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 441 (Conn. 2008) (holding that 
plaintiffs in gay rights case “need not demonstrate that gay persons are politically powerless in any literal sense 
of that term”); Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059, 1080 (1974) 
(“[P]owerlessness or vulnerability is relative.”). 
139 An implication of this point is that judicial protection does not need to be all or nothing. Courts could 
apply sliding-scale scrutiny based on a group’s relative powerlessness, intensifying their review the weaker the 
group is and vice versa. Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (advocating a variant of this sliding-scale approach). 
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A requirement of absolute powerlessness also would be nearly impossible to 
satisfy.140 Take a group with distinctive preferences that can neither promote its 
views effectively nor ally with other groups (such as blacks in the Jim Crow 
South). Even this kind of group occasionally would see its favored policies 
enacted, on the uncommon occasions when its preferences overlapped with the 
majority’s. The group might lose on the matters it cared about most, but it would 
not lose all of the time, on every single item. To insist on complete 
powerlessness thus would be to excise powerlessness from the law. 
Second, consider the claim that policy preferences should be analyzed in the 
aggregate rather than individually. The claim follows from the basic pluralist 
premise that no group is entitled to prevail on any particular issue—that on any 
single vote a group may or may not manage to maneuver its way into the 
majority.141 If this premise holds, then it is illogical to draw broad inferences 
about a group’s power from any individual win or loss. To conclude that a group 
is powerless (or powerful), one must take into account the full range of matters 
over which groups compete—including both live items on the policy agenda and 
settled subjects already incorporated into the status quo.142 As Eric Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule have observed, pluralist theory “aggregates across a large set of 
laws and finds a democratic failure only if a persistent minority . . . is repeatedly 
sacrificed for the benefit of a persistent majority.”143 
Another reason to focus on aggregate preferences is that, if a group is granted 
suspect status due to its powerlessness, the label applies across the board. From 
then on, all laws that discriminate against the group are subject to heightened 
scrutiny, not just those arising in certain domains. As long as suspectness is a 
wholesale (rather than a retail) designation, then, powerlessness should be too.144 
However, just because all issues should be considered does not mean they all 
should be considered equally. A group may hold preferences that vary widely in 
intensity.145 It may care a great deal about one topic, and very little about another. 
In this situation, it is more beneficial to the group, more conducive to its overall 
                                                 
140 See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 444 (explaining that if absolute powerlessness were necessary, then 
neither blacks nor women would qualify for suspect status); Hutchinson, supra note 79, at 998 (“Complete 
deprivation of political power . . . is a difficult, if not impossible, standard to meet . . . .”). 
141 See supra note 127 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1668 
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The minority plainly does not have a right to prevail over majority groups 
in any given political contest.”); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
76 (1980) (dismissing idea that “each time any group loses any political battle . . . it may lay claim to the label 
of ‘political weakness’”). 
142 Settled subjects must be considered because, otherwise, conclusions about group power will be skewed 
heavily by the agenda’s inclusion or exclusion of different issues. See Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two 
Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 948-52 (1962) (arguing that agenda control is crucial second face 
of power).  
143 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1130 
(2006); see also e.g., Tushnet, supra note 129, at 1052 (arguing that a group can be powerless “[o]nly if ‘we-
they’ distinctions cumulate across issues”).  
144 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 97, at 542 (“Because heightened scrutiny follows the classification into 
all contexts, it makes sense to require that [powerlessness] also hold across these contexts.”). 
145 I speak here of groups rather than group members for the sake of consistency with the rest of the 
section. Because groups are not monolithic, it also is common that their preferences on certain issues are 
heterogeneous. The empirical analysis in Section IV.A, infra, explicitly takes into account this heterogeneity by 
using the proportion of a group supporting a policy change as the key independent variable.  
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utility, if it prevails on a matter about which it feels strongly than if it wins on a 
more trivial point. Notably, pluralist theory asserts that groups often trade their 
support on one item for other groups’ backing on other items.146 This kind of 
negotiation can arise only if not all issues are created equal—and it implies that 
preference intensity should be incorporated into powerlessness analysis.147 
Third, the definition’s most vital element is that actual policy enactment be 
treated as the crux of political power. This element has been implicit throughout 
the above discussion of pluralism. To speak of winning or losing coalitions is to 
speak of times when a group did or did not get its preferred policies enacted. 
Similarly, if the thesis of pluralism is that legislation emerges from the 
bargaining of different groups,148 then the thesis above all is one about policy 
outcomes. The judgment reached by Nelson Polsby, another prominent pluralist 
theorist, about the most apt “indices of the power of actors” thus is 
unsurprising.149 After considering “(1) who participates in decision-making, (2) 
who gains and who loses from alternative possible outcomes, and (3) who 
prevails in decision-making,” Polsby concluded that “the last of these seems the 
best way to determine which individuals and groups have ‘more’ power.”150 
But the odds of policy enactment, taken in their raw form, can be misleading. 
The fourth element stipulates that, for the odds to be meaningful, the size of a 
group must be controlled for. Why does size matter? One answer is that, as a 
matter of probability, a larger group is more likely than a smaller one to end up in 
the majority on any given issue. It simply accounts for more of the votes that are 
needed to pass a bill. Another answer is bargaining clout. A larger group 
typically has more leverage than a smaller one because its entry into (or exit 
from) a coalition is more apt to confer (or remove) policy control. Controlling for 
size thus is “essential to the responsible elaboration of Carolene Products,” as 
Bruce Ackerman has put it.151 Without doing so, there is no way to know if a 
group’s influence stems from its group identity or its sheer numerosity. 
Size, though, is not the only thing that must be kept constant. The fifth and 
final element states that group type—such as race, gender, sexual orientation, 
income, and so on—also must be held invariant.152 One reason is that group 
                                                 
146 See supra notes 121-126 and accompanying text. 
147 Cf. Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 142-61 (2000) (suggesting that voting 
could be improved if it took into account preference intensity); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Voting 
Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, 68 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (introducing another 
method, quadratic voting, of taking into account preference intensity in democratic governance). 
148 See, e.g., Darryl Baskin, American Pluralism: Theory, Practice, and Ideology, 32 J. POL. 71, 73 (1970); 
Latham, supra note 123, at 390 (“What may be called public policy is actually the equilibrium reached in the 
group struggle at any given moment.”). 
149 POLSBY, supra note 124, at 4. 
150 Id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Bachrach & Baratz, supra note 142, at 948 (“[P]luralists 
concentrate their attention, not upon the sources of power, but its exercise.”); Richard Davies Parker, The Past 
of Constitutional Theory—and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 249 (1981). 
151 Ackerman, supra note 30, at 722; see also, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy, and 
Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1332 (1993); Ross & Li, supra note 54 (manuscript at 30) 
(“[L]egislators should be more concerned about the potential preferences of larger groups than smaller 
groups.”); Yoshino, supra note 79, at 1804. 
152 Of course, group type often is socially constructed, and one classification (such as income) may well 
blur into another (such as education). And to be clear, by “type” or “classification” I mean any characteristic, 
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power is related to group type in complicated ways, so it is only feasible to assess 
a group’s clout relative to another group identified by the same classification. For 
instance, the power of the bottom income decile sensibly may be compared to 
that of the top decile, since the groups share the same size (10%) and type 
(income). But it would be far trickier to compare the bottom decile’s power to 
that of blacks (a similarly sized group). Race and income are very different 
classifications, so it would be unclear what conclusions to draw from any gaps in 
influence.  
Another reason to control for group type is that people simultaneously can be 
classified along multiple axes. Each of us has a race, a gender, a sexual 
orientation, an income, and so on. It thus is impractical to compare the power of 
groups identified by different classifications because these groups often include 
many of the same people. To return to the above example, the memberships of 
the bottom and top income deciles do not overlap (at any given moment). But 
some people are both in the bottom decile and black. This possibility of 
concurrent membership can be addressed only by keeping group type constant.153 
Put these pieces together and you have my definition of powerlessness: A 
group is relatively powerless if, on the whole, its policy preferences are less 
likely to become law than those of other groups of the same size and type. As this 
definition is somewhat abstract, I next offer a stylized illustration of how it might 
be applied to particular groups and policies. 
 
3. Illustration 
 
Take the category of hair color and make the following assumptions: First, 
that there are two equally sized groups, blondes and brunettes. Second, that there 
are two policy domains, guns and butter, which, contrary to every economics 
textbook, are unrelated to each other.154 Third, that there are two options per 
domain, more or less guns and more or less butter.155 Fourth, that blondes 
intensely prefer more guns and mildly prefer less butter, and that brunettes mildly 
prefer more guns and intensely prefer more butter. And fifth, that the actual 
policy outcomes are more guns and less butter. 
Now we are in a position to assess relative group influence. Initially, we see 
that both of blondes’ favored policies were enacted (more guns and less butter), 
compared to only one of brunettes’ (more guns). Taking preference intensity into 
account, the disparity becomes even starker. Blondes prevailed whether or not 
they felt strongly about a policy. Conversely, brunettes only won on a policy of 
                                                                                                                         
objective or subjective, that can be used to divide the population into a discrete number of non-overlapping 
groups. See also supra note 137 (defining “group” for present purposes). 
153 See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 721 (arguing that “the decisive thought-experiment should involve the 
comparison” of one group with another group that “contain[s] the same proportion of the population” but “is 
unencumbered by the bargaining disadvantages” that affect the first group). 
154 Cf. GUNS AND BUTTER: THE ECONOMIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT (Gregory D. Hess 
ed., 2009). 
155 “More” and “less” here refer to one option versus the other, not to how the options relate to the status 
quo. 
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little value to them (more guns), while losing on the policy they truly cared about 
(more butter). Accordingly, we would conclude that brunettes are powerless 
relative to blondes; despite being equally numerous, their views are less likely to 
become law, even on the issue that matters to them most.  
Of course, groups of the same type seldom have the same population, 
meaning that controls for size usually must be added to the analysis. There also 
are many more than two policy domains and many more than two options per 
domain, making it difficult to ascertain group preferences and policy 
outcomes.156 And group members often disagree with one another and differ in 
the intensity of their views. These internal variations must be incorporated too 
into any estimation of overall group opinion. 
Nevertheless, the basic definitional point should be clear now. Pluralism 
requires a comparison of groups’ records of getting their preferred policies 
enacted. A group is powerless, in pluralist terms, if its record is worse than those 
of its similarly sized and classified peers. What does this logic mean for the other 
notions of powerlessness that have been suggested by courts and scholars? 
Below, I comment on their deficiencies from a pluralist perspective. 
 
B. Power Through Other Prisms 
 
To begin with, four common definitions of group influence—numerical size, 
access to the franchise, descriptive representation, and socioeconomic status157—
share the same flaw.158 All of them conceive of power in terms other than actual 
policy enactment. True, a group’s preferences are more likely to be converted 
into law, ceteris paribus, if the group is large, free to vote, represented by its own 
members, or affluent. In fact, I previously explained why numerical size is such 
an important determinant of policy success that the latter can be analyzed 
properly only by controlling for the former.159 But neither numerical size, nor any 
of the three candidates grouped with it, are equivalent to policy success. At best, 
they are some of its drivers: factors that make it more likely, but not certain, that 
a group’s preferences will be heeded. 
Ely has made this point nicely with respect to access to the franchise and 
descriptive representation. “If voices and votes are all we’re talking about . . . 
other groups may just continue to refuse to deal, and the minority in question 
may just continue to be outvoted.”160 In other words, a group’s odds of passing 
its preferred policies may be too low even if the group is enfranchised and 
                                                 
156 Furthermore, different policy domains often are linked, and it is hard not to pay more attention to the 
status quo than to other policy options. 
157 See supra Part I (presenting these conceptions of group power).  
158 I do not mean to be too critical of these definitions. They all are correlated with actual policy 
enactment, which is no small thing. They also are consistent with important democratic values such as civic 
participation, proportional representation, and social egalitarianism. They just are not consistent with the 
particular democratic theory, pluralism, on which Carolene is based. 
159 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
160 ELY, supra note 86, at 161; see also, e.g., Bradley R. Hogin, Equal Protection, Democratic Theory, and 
the Case of the Poor, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 25 (1989) (“In pluralist democracy, certain groups are politically 
powerless, even though they have the right to vote . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 100, at 154, 159. 
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represented by its own members. A district court in Connecticut has offered a 
similar rebuttal to the argument that gays are politically powerful because they 
wield “‘corporate power’” and control “‘significant sums of money.’”161 There is 
“no authority or evidence demonstrating that this ‘corporate power’ has effected 
appreciable socio-economic or political change,” and “despite these sums raised, 
gay men and lesbians are still unable to impact the outcome of legislative 
processes.”162 Affluence, that is, does not necessarily translate into legislative 
victory.163 
The last proposed definition of group influence—the passage of protective 
legislation164—improves substantially on the previous four. It indeed examines 
what pluralist theory deems the essence of political power, i.e., actual policy 
enactment,165 rather than factors that may or may not lead to it. The drawback of 
this approach, though, is that it does not cast its net widely enough. It looks only 
to the passage of protective legislation, not to the passage of all legislation, 
protective or otherwise.166 It thus violates the pluralist tenet that groups’ 
preferences should be considered in the aggregate, not individually, because no 
minority is entitled to prevail on any particular matter.167 It improperly highlights 
one small corner of the vast issue universe. 
To see why this narrow focus is problematic, suppose that a group is unable 
to secure the enactment of a law banning discrimination against its members. 
Suppose also that most of the group’s other policy priorities (on taxes, spending, 
crime, the environment, and so on) are followed by the legislature. Is it really fair 
to say that the group is politically powerless? Is it not more accurate to conclude 
that the group actually is quite influential—just not omnipotent? Conversely, 
imagine that a group wins the passage of an anti-discrimination law, but loses on 
almost every other policy item. The group’s lone triumph, even on an issue it 
may care about dearly, cannot possibly transform it into a political powerhouse. 
This critique also applies to the more expansive variants of the protective-
legislation definition used by some courts: namely, whether a group is able to 
prevent the enactment of laws victimizing it; and whether a group is able to end, 
though the political process, societal discrimination against it.168 Both of these 
variants should be commended for broadening the inquiry beyond protective 
legislation alone. But both remain vulnerable to pluralist attack for not 
broadening it enough. The policy set of protective and antagonistic legislation, 
relating to de jure and societal discrimination, still amounts to only a fraction of 
all the issues that should be analyzed in assessing group power. It continues to be 
                                                 
161 Pedersen v. Office of Personal Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331-32 (D. Conn. 2012). 
162 Id.  
163 And, to finish off the list, it is obvious that a group can be both numerically large and a perennial loser 
in the political process (or vice versa). See Ball, supra note 138, at 1080 (“A group may be small in number but 
. . . possessed of the power to protect itself.”); Strauss, supra note 100, at 155. 
164 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text. 
166 See, e.g., Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (“The passage of such legislation suggests only an isolated 
achievement . . . and is not indicative of . . . political clout . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 100, at 156-59. 
167 See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
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possible that a group thwarts bills persecuting it and extinguishes societal 
prejudice against it while losing on all other matters (or vice versa).  
A further objection to the existing notions of powerlessness—albeit a 
doctrinal rather than a theoretical one—is that they are difficult to reconcile with 
the Court’s suspect class designations.169 Numerical size is a problematic 
definition because women are a suspect class despite comprising a majority of 
the population.170 The right to vote is inadequate because women, racial 
minorities, and religious groups all are enfranchised; while minors (who are not a 
suspect class) are not.171 Descriptive representation fails because blacks are 
represented roughly proportionately;172 while the poor (not a suspect class) are 
sharply underrepresented.173 Socioeconomic status misfires because Asian 
Americans174 and Jews175 are protected despite their relative affluence; while the 
poor are unprotected despite being, well, poor. And the passage of protective 
legislation implies that women, racial minorities, and religious groups (all the 
beneficiaries of numerous laws) should not be suspect classes.176 
Of course, it is not a fatal weakness that a proposed definition fails to account 
fully for current doctrine. Some of the proponents of the above approaches may 
well want to modify the Court’s suspect class designations. But if that is their 
intent, they have not said so explicitly.177 They also have not acknowledged the 
sweeping transformations of equal protection law that several of their preferred 
options would entail—in particular, the potential end of suspect status for blacks 
and women. In contrast, as I explain later in the Article, my conception of 
powerlessness would not result in such radical change.178 It would preserve the 
current position of blacks and women (though it also would support the inclusion 
of the poor in the ranks of the suspect classes).179 This greater consistency with 
existing law is perhaps a minor point in favor of my approach. 
                                                 
169 They are difficult, rather than impossible, to reconcile because powerlessness is only one of the indicia 
of suspect status. A group could be powerless but still not a suspect class (or vice versa) depending on which 
way the other indicia point. 
170 See ELY, supra note 86, at 164 (“Finally, lest you think I missed it, women have about half the votes, 
apparently more.”). 
171 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (observing that “[m]inors cannot vote and thus might be 
considered politically powerless to an extreme degree” under a franchise theory). 
172 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 834 (2013) 
(noting that blacks account for 13% of population and 10% of members of Congress). 
173 See Ross & Li, supra note 54 (manuscript at 4) (noting that only 6% of members of Congress worked 
in blue-collar jobs). 
174 See Median Income of People in Constant (2009) Dollars by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 
2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0701.pdf 
(showing that median income is higher for Asian Americans than for whites, blacks, or Hispanics). 
175 See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY: RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 60 (2008) (showing that 46% of Jewish respondents have annual income 
of above $100,000, compared to 18% of general population). 
176 See Hutchinson, supra note 79, at 995; Strauss, supra note 100, at 157 (noting this implication of 
Reconstruction Amendments and Civil Rights Acts of 1868 and 1964). 
177 But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that women 
should not be considered a suspect class because they are not politically powerless). 
178 See infra Parts III, IV. 
179 See id. 
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This concludes my definitional argument, meaning that I could proceed 
directly to my empirical analysis of powerlessness. (And readers who are 
impatient to get to the empirics are encouraged to skip ahead to Parts III and IV.) 
But before attempting to quantify powerlessness, I think it is important to try to 
come to grips with the various issues it implicates.180 Next, I sort these issues into 
three categories, involving (1) the causes and levels of group power; (2) the legal 
place of the powerlessness doctrine; and (3) courts’ capacity to implement the 
doctrine. I do not purport to wrestle these difficult matters to the ground, but I do 
begin what I hope is a useful exploration of some intriguing and understudied 
subjects. 
 
C. Powerlessness in Perspective 
 
1. Causes and Levels 
 
Perhaps the most obvious question raised by the powerlessness factor is 
whether it matters what the reason is for a group’s lack of influence. In Carolene 
itself, the Court offered one potential cause of powerlessness: “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities” that prevents them from enjoying sufficient 
policy success.181 Scholars subsequently have criticized Carolene’s hypothesis, 
on the ground that discreteness and insularity often contribute to, rather than 
detract from, a group’s clout.182 They also have proposed several causes of their 
own. For instance, Ackerman has argued that a group’s anonymity and 
diffuseness typically sap its political strength.183 Jack Balkin has emphasized the 
link between resources and power, claiming that it is asset-deprived groups that 
are most prone to weakness.184 Bradley Hogin has made a similar point with 
respect to participation: groups whose members are less politically engaged may 
suffer at the bargaining table.185 And political scientists have explained how party 
coalitions, leadership positions, and institutional structures may shape power as 
well.186 
                                                 
180 These issues also could be framed as objections to my definitional argument, to which I now respond. 
181 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
182 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 723; Strauss, supra note 135, at 1264 (“[M]embers of discrete 
and insular groups will in fact exercise greater power than their numbers warrant.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest 
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 34 (1985). 
183 See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 724 (“[G]roups that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ . . . . are 
systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.”). 
184 See Jack M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 309 (1989) (referring to “the most obvious 
cause of all—disparities in political power caused by differences in economic power”). 
185 See Hogin, supra note 160, at 29 (focusing on groups’ “chronic quiescence”). At the edge of the 
participational spectrum are groups that deliberately choose not to engage at all in the political process (perhaps 
the Amish in Pennsylvania or certain arch-Orthodox Jews in Israel). Classic pluralist theory does not 
contemplate the existence of such groups, and it may be a bit rich for minorities that intentionally exclude 
themselves from the pluralist fray then to complain that their policy preferences have not been heeded. 
186 See, e.g., CHRISTIAN R. GROSE, CONGRESS IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND REPRESENTATION IN 
WASHINGTON AND AT HOME 55 (2011) (party coalitions); KERRY L. HAYNIE, AFRICAN AMERICAN 
LEGISLATORS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 75-81 (2001) (leadership positions); Zoltan L. Hajnal et al., Minorities 
and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 156 (2002) 
(institutional structures such as direct democracy). 
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Carolene can be read as holding that the reason for a group’s powerlessness 
does matter—and, indeed, must be “prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities.”187 Justice Scalia apparently endorsed this view in a recent 
concurrence, suggesting that blacks in Michigan are not a suspect class because 
they neither are insular nor face prejudice from other groups.188 On the other 
hand, the powerlessness doctrine itself, in its classic formulation, makes no 
reference to any causes.189 And in a 1982 concurrence, Justice Blackmun asserted 
bluntly, “[I]t never has been suggested that the reason for a discrete class’s 
political powerlessness is significant; instead, the fact of powerlessness is 
crucial.”190 So which is it? Does powerlessness always support a designation of 
suspect status, or only if Carolene’s hypothesis is confirmed? 
Based on pluralist theory, I think the answer has to be the former. As 
discussed above, pluralism fails to protect minorities if their aggregate 
preferences are heeded less often than those of groups of a similar size and 
type.191 Under this conception of pluralist failure, the explanation for a group’s 
relative lack of political success is irrelevant. All that matters is that the group in 
fact loses more often than it should, because the group then is not benefiting from 
the mechanisms that are supposed to assure it its fair share of legislative wins. To 
put the point another way, the promise of pluralism is that each group will end up 
in the prevailing coalition as frequently as its similarly sized and classified peers. 
If a group does not end up in the majority as often, no matter what the reason, the 
promise has not been kept.192 
True, there is a certain oddity to pledging allegiance to Carolene’s theory but 
not to its text. But the text is tentative rather than sure. “Nor need we enquire,” 
wrote the Court, whether its posited cause “may be a special condition” that 
“tends seriously to curtail” the usual pluralist safeguards.193 The text also turns 
                                                                                                                         
Still another possibility is that a group loses more often than its peers because its policy preferences are, 
on net, ideologically extreme and so far from the midpoint of public opinion. This explanation also is in tension 
with classic pluralist theory, whose perspective on groups’ interests is distinctly transactional and non-
ideological. And in its emphasis on the median voter, the explanation seems more consistent with 
majoritarianism—which, as explained infra in Section II.C.2, is not a theory that can be reconciled with 
pluralism.  
187 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
188 See Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1645 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Nor 
does [the dissent] explain why certain racial minorities in Michigan qualify as ‘insular,’ meaning that other 
groups will not form coalitions with them—and, critically, not because of lack of common interests but because 
of ‘prejudice.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
189 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (asking whether group is 
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process”).  
190 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
191 See supra Section II.A. 
192 For scholars making similar arguments, see Ball, supra note 138, at 1080 (“What engages judicial 
protection is a minority’s impotence in protecting itself, whether insular or not.”), and Loffredo, supra note 151, 
at 1335 (“Why should the absence of prejudice end the inquiry into democratic malfunction?”). Cf. Thornburg 
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (plurality opinion) (concluding that, in polarization analysis under Voting 
Rights Act, “only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the causes of the 
correlation, matters”). 
193 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added); see also Louis 
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (1982) (noting that 
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out to be wrong. Ackerman’s famous argument that discreteness and insularity 
usually enhance group power devastated Carolene’s hypothesis, and it has not 
been rehabilitated since.194 The oddity of ignoring Carolene’s text thus pales in 
comparison to the strangeness of taking it seriously. If powerlessness had to be 
produced by prejudice against discrete and insular minorities, it very rarely 
would be found. At the same time, the political weakness that does handicap 
many groups, caused by anonymity, diffuseness, poverty, alienation, and the like, 
would fail to register on the judicial consciousness. 
But for my position on causality to be convincing, it is not just Carolene’s 
hypothesis that must be rejected, but the need for any reason for powerlessness. 
How, then, to respond to Laurence Tribe’s well-known hypothetical about 
burglars—a group that presumably lacks political influence due to its 
misconduct, but for whom “[s]uspect status is unthinkable”?195 One tack is to 
deny the premise. Burglars’ preferences as to the crime of burglary routinely may 
be rebuffed (since the crime exists), but it is entirely unclear how often they find 
themselves in the winning coalition on other matters. We no more can conclude 
from burglars’ loss on the burglary issue that they are powerless, than we can 
from other groups’ inability to pass protective legislation.196 A single defeat does 
not make a minority a perpetual victim. 
The other answer to the hypothetical is that the sky would not fall if burglars 
in fact were deemed powerless. For one thing, powerlessness is just one of the 
indicia of suspect status.197 None of the other indicia apply to burglars, meaning 
that their lack of clout would not give them a very strong claim to judicial 
protection. For another, even if burglars did qualify as a suspect class, the only 
consequence would be that policies discriminating against them, such as the one 
criminalizing burglary, would be subject to heightened scrutiny. But there is little 
doubt that these policies would survive the more rigorous examination. In Ely’s 
words, “There is so patently a substantial goal here . . . and the fit between that 
goal and the classification is so close, that whatever suspicion such a 
classification might . . . engender is allayed so immediately it doesn’t even have 
time to register.”198 
Now shift gears from the causes of group power to its levels. It should be 
obvious that a group’s political influence can vary from one period or jurisdiction 
to the next. A group might find itself on the losing side of too many policy 
                                                                                                                         
footnote four was “offered not as a settled theorem of government or Court-approved standard of judicial 
review, but as a starting point for debate”). 
194 See generally Ackerman, supra note 30; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 94, at 699 (describing 
Ackerman’s argument as “an intellectual tour de force”). 
195 Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 
1063, 1075 (1980). 
196 See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text (explaining that passage of protective legislation is 
faulty notion of group power because it does not consider aggregate policy preferences). 
197 For a more extended discussion of the other indicia, see Section II.C.2, infra. 
198 ELY, supra note 86, at 154. To put this point in doctrinal terms, the state has a compelling interest in 
condemning harmful practices like burglary, as well as in reducing the actual volume of burglary. A law 
criminalizing burglary clearly serves the state’s expressive interest in condemnation, and presumably (though it 
is an empirical question) serves the state’s interest in making burglary rarer too. 
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disputes in a given time or place. But, in another, the group might prevail just as 
often as we would expect given its size and type. The question then becomes 
whether legal findings of powerlessness (with the suspect class designations that, 
in part, follow from them) should reflect these fluctuations in clout. 
In a 1989 case, the Court hinted that they should.199 Faced with a minority 
set-aside program passed by the majority-black Richmond City Council, the 
Court assumed without deciding that “the level of scrutiny varies according to the 
ability of different groups to defend their interests in the representative 
process.”200 Since blacks controlled this particular city’s government, they were 
not a powerless group in this location.201 Conversely, in a 1978 case, the Court 
sharply criticized the idea that suspect status should differ temporally or 
spatially.202 If “judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic 
background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces,” then there is no 
“consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next.”203 
Under pluralist theory, it seems clear that powerlessness analysis should be 
dynamic. If a group was a perennial loser in another time or place, but is not in 
this one, then there is no clout-based reason for the group to enjoy extra judicial 
protection. It is navigating the political shoals adeptly on its own, just as 
pluralism expects it to. Likewise, if a group won its fair share of policy battles 
under other circumstances, but does not do so here, then its claim to suspect 
status should not be undercut by its erstwhile successes. The pluralist breakdown 
in this setting should not be overlooked because the pluralist machinery operated 
smoothly sometime or somewhere else.204 
The temporal instability implied by this approach does not strike me as 
problematic. As the Article’s empirical sections show, the influence of most 
groups does not change very much over time.205 In fact, groups recognized as 
suspect classes decades ago, such as racial minorities and women, remain 
relatively powerless today.206 And if they eventually were to develop sufficient 
sway, then I think it would be appropriate for their privileged legal position to be 
rethought. They no longer would have the same need for it, despite their past 
defeats. 
                                                 
199 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
200 Id. 
201 See id. (noting that “[f]ive of the nine seats on the city council are held by blacks”). Similarly, under 
the Court’s Section 2 doctrine, a group’s ability to “elect representatives of [its] choice,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), 
may vary temporally and spatially as levels of political cohesion and racial polarization fluctuate. 
202 See Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296-98 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
203 Id. at 298. For other expressions of judicial skepticism about recognizing variations in group power, see 
Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1014 (W.D. Wisc. 2014), and Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 
957 A.2d 407, 502 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting) (“No one has ever suggested—nor do I—that, once 
established, a class entitled to heightened scrutiny protection may subsequently lose that status if its political 
power grows substantially.”). 
204 For scholars making similar arguments, see Ackerman, supra note 30, at 734, Eskridge, supra note 93, 
at 2379, Fiss, supra note 34, at 155, and Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene 
Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 177 (2004) (explaining that pluralist theory “avoid[s] the danger of 
tagging any group with the status of a permanent victim—or, equally disturbingly, with the status of a 
permanent preferred group”).  
205 See infra Parts III, IV. 
206 See id. 
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I am more concerned, however, about the approach’s spatial instability. For 
one thing, it probably is not feasible for courts to make localized determinations 
of powerlessness—to conclude, say, that blacks have enough influence in North 
Carolina but not South Carolina, or in Newark but not New York City. For 
another, in our complex and multilayered system, it is doubtful that power can be 
assessed coherently at a subnational level. If women are politically ineffective in 
Chicago, effective in Illinois, and ineffective again in Washington, D.C., for 
instance, what is a court to do?207 For these reasons, my provisional view is that 
powerlessness should be analyzed with respect to the country as a whole. A 
group’s clout at different governmental levels can and should be taken into 
account, but a single national answer should be reached at any given time.208 
So much, then, for the causes and levels of group power. Next, I discuss the 
second set of issues implicated by the powerlessness factor: namely, how it 
relates to the other suspect class criteria, to equal protection doctrine in its 
entirety, and to the democratic theories that underlie constitutional law. All of 
these issues probe the place of powerlessness in our legal system.209 
 
2. Legal Position 
 
Start with the other indicia of suspect status: (1) whether a group has 
experienced a history of discrimination; (2) whether a group is defined by an 
immutable characteristic; and (3) whether a group is defined by a trait that 
typically bears no relation to the group’s ability to contribute to society.210 How 
is powerlessness linked to these factors? Unfortunately, the Court has never said. 
Instead, it has applied the criteria in what a lower court politely has described as 
a “flexible manner,”211 sometimes addressing and sometimes inexplicably 
ignoring each element. In Michael Dorf’s stronger language, when courts 
consider whether to dub a group a suspect class, “[t]he embarrassing fact of the 
matter is that they simply make it up.”212 
                                                 
207 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 553-54 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that even if blacks were powerful in Richmond itself, “the numerical and political dominance of 
nonminorities within the State of Virginia and the Nation as a whole provides an enormous political check” on 
their influence). 
208 See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 351 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part ) (“[T]he focus on political power . . . has to be national, not local, lest constitutional 
rights vary from city to city.”). 
209 A related question is how the powerlessness doctrine compares to the chief statutory protection for 
minority groups, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A group’s political influence plainly is relevant to 
“whether there is a lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the 
members of the minority group,” which is one of the factors that courts consider in Section 2’s totality-of-
circumstances inquiry. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 37, 45 (1986). But Section 2’s key goal is that 
minorities be able to elect their preferred candidates in sufficient numbers. This variant of descriptive 
representation is quite different from the pluralistic theory that underpins the powerlessness doctrine. 
210 For examples of courts identifying and then analyzing these criteria, see Windsor v. United States, 699 
F.3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 
407, 425-61 (Conn. 2008), and Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 886-96 (Iowa 2009). 
211 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 888. 
212 Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 964 (2002); see also, e.g., 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 503 (2004) (arguing that suspect class 
criteria “suffer from both misapplication and theoretical inconsistencies”). 
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If courts were not to make it up, one option would be to prioritize 
powerlessness over the other three factors. As explained earlier, there is a strong 
pluralist case for conferring heightened protection to a group that loses too often 
in the political process.213 This case is not weakened if the group is lucky enough 
not to have been discriminated against historically, or if its defining trait is 
mutable or sometimes germane to its societal contributions. Even if the other 
criteria go unmet, there still has been a pluralist malfunction that requires a 
judicial response. Following precisely this logic, as Strauss has noted, “some 
courts consider political powerlessness to be the ultimate question and view the 
other factors as subissues.”214 
This is not to say that the other factors would be irrelevant if powerlessness 
became the one criterion to rule them all.215 In certain cases, they could help 
illuminate why a group does or does not lack influence. For example, a history of 
discrimination, like the “prejudice” cited by Carolene, is one reason why a group 
may be less able to bargain effectively with other parties.216 Similarly, as Jeffrey 
Roy has argued, immutable traits are more likely to divide society into a set of 
stable coalitions, one of which then may extract rents at the expense of the 
others.217 These kinds of explanations would not be required under a 
powerlessness-centered approach (since it would be the existence of 
powerlessness, not its causes, that would be dispositive). But they could add 
context and texture to the key judicial inquiry.218 
However, there are at least two arguments against ranking powerlessness 
above the other indicia. First, while there is a strong pluralist case for judicial 
intervention if a group is too politically weak, there is no reason why pluralism 
has to be the dispositive theory for suspect status designations. The 
powerlessness factor may be derived from Carolene, which in turn may be 
derived from pluralism—but the other factors flow from theories of their own, 
which cannot be dismissed simply because they are different. The idea of suspect 
                                                 
213 See supra Section II.A. 
214 Strauss, supra note 100, at 153; see also Yoshino, supra note 97, at 565 (“I propose that the limiting 
principle [for suspect class designations] should be a refined analysis of political powerlessness.”). 
215 With apologies to Tolkien’s one ring. 
216 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117 (2010) (“[W]hen there 
is a lot of prejudice, a group probably doesn’t have much opportunity to influence legislators . . . .”). 
217 See Jeffrey A. Roy, Carolene Products: A Game-Theoretic Approach, 2002 BYU L. REV. 53, 87 
(explaining that “a trait used for rent seeking” is likely to be “immutable in the sense that the memberships of 
the majority and minority should be subject to little change over time”). 
218 This is a good place to note that even if suspect status were based exclusively on powerlessness, the 
grant of the former would be unlikely to end the latter. Suspect status would mean that laws discriminating 
against the powerless group are subject to heightened scrutiny. But more radical action, involving legislation 
rather than litigation, probably would be needed to realize the pluralist vision. However, this point also applies 
to all of the other indicia of suspect status. Suspect status would not end discrimination against a group or make 
its defining trait less immutable or more societally relevant either. There is a general lack of fit between the 
indicia and the consequences of suspect status. 
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status also is not tied as closely to Carolene as powerlessness,219 meaning that the 
former does not necessarily share the latter’s pluralist orientation. 
Second, prioritizing powerlessness would entail prioritizing its particular 
conception of suspect status. But this conception is controversial, and it conflicts 
with the understanding embodied in some of the other indicia. More specifically, 
powerlessness and a history of discrimination both apply to particular groups and 
so imply that classes should be suspect. But immutability and societal relevance 
both apply to particular traits and so imply that classifications should be suspect. 
The first two indicia suggest that extra judicial attention should be reserved for 
blacks but not whites, women but not men, gays but not straights, and so on. But 
the latter two mean that all groups defined by race, gender, sexuality, and the like 
should be protected—the privileged no less than the disadvantaged.220 
I do not believe this conflict can be papered over. Thinking about suspect 
status in terms of classes is fundamentally at odds with thinking about it in terms 
of classifications. Beyond noting the doctrinal discord, though, I would make one 
further point: The fact that courts continue to employ all four criteria indicates 
that they have not, as is sometimes supposed,221 concluded that only 
classifications can be deemed suspect. There must be something left to the notion 
of suspect classes if two of the four criteria see the world in terms of groups 
rather than traits. Plainly, the suspect class approach has lost ground since 
Carolene’s original group-focused formulation.222 But it is fairer to label the 
status quo a stalemate than a rout for the suspect classification side.223 
Essentially the same point holds if the level of generality is raised from the 
indicia of suspect status to the overarching theories of equal protection. The 
powerlessness factor is remarkably consistent with the anti-subordination theory, 
which maintains that courts should scrutinize most closely laws that 
disproportionately harm subordinated groups.224 Almost by definition, groups 
that are politically powerless are politically subordinated too.225 But the anti-
subordination theory is not the dominant account of equal protection law. 
                                                 
219 The Court began using the terminology of suspect status in the 1970s, in cases such as Rodriguez, 
without explicitly linking the concept to Carolene. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
28 (1973). 
220 I am not the first to notice the tension at the heart of the indicia. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 212, at 
504; Ortiz, supra note 101, at 732 (“The Court applies both process review and its naughty opposite, substantive 
review, at the same time.”); Yoshino, supra note 97, at 563. 
221 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (noting “the common assumption that, during the Second 
Reconstruction, the anticlassification principle triumphed”). 
222 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (referring to “discrete and insular minorities”). 
223 The enormous volume of case law on whether gays are a suspect class, see supra Section I.A., 
confirms the continued relevance of the group-focused criteria. So do the Court’s repeated analyses of 
powerlessness even after supposedly endorsing the anti-differentiation theory in the 1970s. See supra note 88 
(collecting cases). 
224 See Fiss, supra note 34, at 155 (referring jointly to blacks’ “perpetual subordination and circumscribed 
political power” as reason why they should qualify as suspect class); see also generally Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994). 
225 See Roy, supra note 217, at 78 (“The Carolene Products approach ties naturally to an antisubordination 
theory because it focuses on a group’s lack of power in the political process.”). 
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Instead, it is the anti-differentiation theory, which requires stricter review for 
laws that distinguish among people on certain grounds, that is ascendant.226 The 
anti-differentiation theory, like the suspect classification approach, treats all 
groups defined by the same trait identically.227 It thus is irreconcilable with the 
claim that the powerless, but not the powerful, are entitled to enhanced judicial 
protection. 
Again, then, the continued existence of the powerlessness factor shows that 
the triumph of anti-differentiation over anti-subordination is incomplete. If it 
were complete, the Court would not tolerate a criterion that sounds so clearly in 
anti-subordination. Nor is the powerlessness factor the only doctrinal outpost of 
anti-subordination values. As Reva Siegel has documented, they also persist in 
the state interest in diversity, which prizes the participation of marginalized 
groups;228 in disparate impact law, which upholds facially neutral policies aimed 
at helping minorities;229 and in the definition of racial classification, which omits 
certain benign uses of racial categories.230 These further manifestations of anti-
subordination principles confirm that the powerlessness factor is no outlier, no 
artifact of a bygone legal era. The factor bears witness, rather, that the struggle 
over the soul of equal protection still rages. 
Now raise the level of generality by one more notch, from the theories of 
equal protection to the theories of democracy on which much of constitutional 
law is built. As I have reiterated, the powerlessness factor is rooted in one 
particular democratic theory: pluralism, the idea that when many groups compete 
and bargain with one another, no group permanently is excluded from the 
majority, and policy approximating the public interest emerges from the 
contestation.231 But pluralism is not the only available democratic theory,232 and 
it has endured attacks from many different quarters. So what happens to the 
powerlessness doctrine if pluralism itself is discredited? 
It depends on the critique. Several of the best-known challenges to pluralism 
accept its normative premise that it would be desirable if similarly sized and 
classified groups were equally likely to end up in the prevailing coalition. They 
just allege that this equal likelihood is illusory. For instance, public choice theory 
                                                 
226 See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 221, at 10; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1537 (2004) 
(describing the “conventional understanding” that “the Court embraced anticlassification and repudiated 
antisubordination”); see also supra note 33 (explaining my reasons for labeling theory “anti-differentiation”). 
227 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) 
(“It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial 
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”); Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995) (advancing “the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect 
persons, not groups”). 
228 See Siegel, supra note 226, at 1539 (explaining that diversity interest includes “ensuring that no group 
is excluded from participating in public life and thus relegated to . . . second-class status”). 
229 See id. at 1541 (observing that “facially neutral, racially allocative state action that benefits subordinate 
groups is constitutionally permissible”). 
230 See id. at 1543 (noting that courts uphold “racial data collection” “without characterizing it as a racial 
classification subject to the presumption of unconstitutionality”). 
231 See supra Section II.A. 
232 On the essentially contested nature of democracy, see Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 737 (2004). 
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contends that concentrated groups enjoy more policy success than diffuse ones, 
because they are better able to organize effectively and avoid free-rider 
problems.233 Similarly, E.E. Schattschneider has quipped memorably that “[t]he 
flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent.”234 Affluent groups, that is, systematically outperform poorer ones. 
Crucially, if either public choice theory or Schattschneider is correct, the 
implication is not that the powerlessness factor should be discarded. The upshot, 
instead, is that pluralism breaks down relatively often, and thus that a relatively 
large number of groups lack sufficient influence. This is a rationale for greater 
judicial intervention, not for renunciation of the underlying pluralist hope. 
On the other hand, other democratic theories amount to rejections of 
pluralism all the way down. Take the raw majoritarianism that is implicit in the 
second paragraph of Carolene’s fourth footnote.235 If there is such a thing as a 
consistent majority—and if its preferences deserve to be followed as a normative 
matter—then the conceptual foundation of the powerlessness doctrine collapses. 
In a purely majoritarian democracy, minorities are entitled only to lose. Their 
repeated setbacks are par for the course, not cause for judicial concern.236 
Likewise, consider democratic theories that focus on participation237 or 
deliberation.238 It is irrelevant to them as well if certain groups fail to join the 
winning coalition with sufficient regularity. Perpetual defeat is perfectly 
consistent with extensive civic engagement or enlightened public discourse. 
To be sure, these theories contemplate democratic malfunctions of their own. 
For a majoritarian, the great fear is that the majority’s views will not be heeded, 
perhaps because of problems in the electoral system.239 For a participatory 
                                                 
233 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971); see also BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 118, at 67 (claiming that with 
emergence of public choice theory, “the pluralist perspective was essentially dead”); Saul Levmore, Voting 
Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 259 (1999) (arguing that public choice theory is most 
applicable “where there are excellent opportunities to influence agenda setters or to bargain for the formation of 
winning coalitions”). 
234 SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 118, at 35; see also, e.g., William E. Connolly, The Challenge to 
Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 3, 15 (William E. Connolly ed., 1969) (“[T]he pluralist system is 
significantly biased toward the concerns and priorities of corporate elites.”). 
235 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (referring to majoritarianism 
when describing “those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation”); Klarman, supra note 92, at 781 (explaining that Carolene’s second paragraph treats 
majoritarianism as “the linchpin of our political system”).  
236 See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 719 (“[M]inorities are supposed to lose in a [majoritarian] system—
even when they want very much to win . . . .”). Essentially the same point applies to theories focusing on 
political parties. See, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT (1942). If stable and coherent parties 
exist, then fluid pluralist competition does not. 
237 See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 
(1984); Hogin, supra note 160, at 29 (noting that participatory democracy “dramatically expands the scope of 
equal protection review beyond the Carolene Products model”). 
238 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692 (1984) (arguing that 
deliberative democracy “is especially at odds with pluralism”). 
239 For an argument along these lines, emphasizing the many ways that electoral rules can produce 
misalignment with the majority’s views, see generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014). 
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democrat, public alienation from politics is the bête noire.240 And for a 
deliberative democrat, policy enacted due to “naked preferences,” not public-
regarding reasons, is the deepest concern.241 But the key point here is that even if 
these malfunctions support judicial involvement, the kind of activity they justify 
bears no resemblance to that entailed by the powerlessness doctrine. A court that 
intervened to ease the passage of items favored by the majority, to rouse the 
citizenry from its dormancy, or to strike down poorly reasoned legislation, would 
be operating in a manner entirely alien to the doctrine. Accordingly, if pluralism 
is cast aside in favor of another full-blown theory of democracy, the 
powerlessness factor must be tossed out with it. The factor cannot survive the 
replacement of the pluralist hope with a different democratic aspiration.242 
Shifting from the theoretical to the practical, can the factor even survive its 
judicial implementation? In other words, are courts actually capable of 
identifying powerless groups and then riding to their rescue? These issues of 
institutional capacity are the last ones I address in this Part. 
 
4. Judicial Capacity 
 
In a series of recent articles, Eskridge,243 Schacter,244 and Yoshino245 all have 
identified an irony at the core of the powerlessness doctrine. In their view, courts 
applying the doctrine typically confer suspect status to powerful groups and deny 
it to the truly powerless. As Yoshino has put it, “A group must have an immense 
amount of political power before it will be deemed politically powerless.”246 One 
explanation for this curious pattern is that judges may be as vulnerable to biases 
and blind spots as the rest of society. They may be conditioned to respond 
favorably to the claims of influential groups and to spurn those of pariahs.247 
Another explanation is that courts may be wary of the repercussions of ruling in 
favor of marginalized minorities. In Eskridge’s words, courts that “rile prejudiced 
majorities . . . . risk[] a tremendous popular backlash.”248 
One response to this alleged irony is that it is largely beside the point. My 
main goals in this Article are to define powerlessness in a theoretically sensible 
                                                 
240 See, e.g., Hogin, supra note 160, at 29. 
241 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 238, at 1692. 
242 In this vein, it is important to note that the popularity of pluralism has declined since its mid-twentieth-
century heyday. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 118, at 87; Ross, supra note 118, at 1610. The 
continuing existence of the powerlessness factor thus puts us in the unusual position of having to develop a 
doctrine based on a theory that is no longer widely accepted. 
243 See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 18 (“[I]f a minority group is totally powerless . . . the Equal Protection 
Clause will not protect that group.”). 
244 See Schacter, supra note 76, at 1399-1401. 
245 See generally Yoshino, supra note 108. Michael Klarman also has made this point with respect to 
Supreme Court intervention generally (rather than the powerlessness factor specifically). See generally 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
RACIAL EQUALITY (2006). 
246 Id. at 541. 
247 See ELY, supra note 86, at 168 (“Judges tend to belong the same broad categories as legislators . . . . 
and there isn’t any reason to suppose that they are immune to the usual temptations of self-aggrandizing 
generalization.”); Eskridge, supra note 53, at 18; Schacter, supra note 76, at 1399. 
248 Eskridge, supra note 53, at 25-26. 
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way and to measure its levels for different groups. The legal realist claim that 
courts do not enforce the powerlessness doctrine properly is not particularly 
relevant to these normative and empirical aims. It demonstrates that courts are 
not following the law, but it says nothing about what courts should do, especially 
if they were given the requisite data.249 
This response, though, is not very satisfying. Is implies ought; if courts 
inevitably ignore the powerless, there is little point to defining powerlessness 
more precisely and imploring courts to stick to the improved definition.250 But I 
do not think there is anything inevitable about it. First, as an institutional matter, 
courts seem relatively well-suited to implementing the powerlessness doctrine. 
Their steady stream of cases exposes them to many unpopular litigants, making it 
plausible that they will be more receptive to these parties’ pleas than other 
governmental actors. At the federal level, judges also have life tenure, and so are 
more insulated than other actors from the political consequences of their 
decisions. These characteristics may not make courts attentive to the powerless in 
any absolute sense, but they at least should yield comparative advantages.251 
And second, as a factual matter, courts do not always reject the claims of 
vulnerable groups. The quintessential suspect classes, by most accounts, are 
blacks and women. As the next two Parts illustrate, both of these groups remain 
relatively powerless because, controlling for size, their preferences are much less 
likely to be enacted than those of whites and men.252 Blacks and women may not 
lack any influence at all, but this has never been the doctrinal test. Accordingly, 
the irony spotted by Eskridge, Schacter, and Yoshino evaporates once a 
theoretically suitable definition of powerlessness is adopted.253 By providing 
greater protection to blacks and women, courts have proven that they are willing 
to grant suspect status to groups that merit it. The courthouse door is not just 
open to the powerful. 
Willingness to protect the powerless, though, is not the only capacity-related 
issue that must be considered. Courts also must be able to tell whether groups 
lack sufficient influence. That is, they must be able to distinguish between groups 
that enjoy enough policy success, given their size and type, and groups that do 
not. And this is not always an easy task. As one lower court has complained, the 
powerlessness factor “involve[s] a myriad of complex and interrelated 
                                                 
249 This also is my response to the claim that the powerlessness factor—and, indeed, all of the suspect 
class criteria—do not matter very much because courts can reach their preferred outcomes regardless of the 
level of scrutiny they apply. Even if this claim is correct, it is largely irrelevant to my effort here to get to the 
bottom of how the powerlessness factor should be implemented. 
250 This is why Eskridge and Schacter both urge the elimination of the powerlessness factor. See Eskridge, 
supra note 53, at 20; Schacter, supra note 76, at 1403. 
251 See ELY, supra note 86, at 103 (arguing that judges are “in a position objectively to assess claims” 
relating to “majority tyranny”); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 67 (1991) (noting importance of “comparative question” of whether courts or other 
actors are better suited to particular tasks). 
252 See infra Parts III-IV. 
253 Not surprisingly, these scholars employ definitions of powerlessness that are more difficult for groups 
to satisfy, leading to their so-called paradox. See supra Section I.B.  
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considerations of a kind not readily susceptible to judicial fact-finding.”254 Or as 
David Strauss has written, the factor “requires the Justices to be, in a sense, 
amateur political scientists. They have to decide just which groups in American 
politics are able to form coalitions, and how easily.”255 
This concern cannot be resolved through logical reasoning. Only data can 
show that powerlessness, as I conceive of it, can be measured and then usefully 
applied. The balance of the Article, then, is devoted to this demonstration. First, 
in Part III, I survey the existing political science literature on group influence. 
Some of it is quite useful (especially the work on the sway of different income 
strata), but much of it either fails to control for group size or studies 
representation rather than policy enactment. Next, in Part IV, I carry out my own 
empirical analysis of powerlessness. Using newly available data at both the 
federal and state levels, I am able to operationalize the definition I have advanced 
above.256 Together, these Parts establish that, while powerlessness is a complex 
concept, it is not impervious to quantification. It thus cannot be dismissed on 
grounds of unmanageability. 
 
III. EXISTING EMPIRICS 
 
The perfect study, for present purposes, would assess the odds of a group’s 
aggregate policy preferences being enacted, while controlling for the group’s size 
and type. A small subset of the literature comes close to this ideal, though only 
with respect to income. This work finds that the poor are relatively powerless at 
both the federal and state levels. Unfortunately, most of the relevant studies are 
lacking in several respects. If they examine policy enactment at all, they tend to 
consider only a few issues and not to control for group size. More often, they 
evaluate representation rather than the passage of legislation (though, in this case, 
sometimes holding size constant).257 While not fully applicable for these reasons, 
this work concludes that racial minorities, women, and gays all lack sufficient 
political influence. 
Below, then, I summarize the existing scholarship on group power. I arrange 
the studies by group type, beginning with classifications already deemed 
                                                 
254 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 429 (Conn. 2008); see also Regents of Univ. of 
Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“The kind of variable sociological and political 
analysis necessary to produce such rankings [under the history-of-discrimination factor] simply does not lie 
within the judicial competence . . . .”); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 656 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (warning that “unless the Court can precisely define and constitutionally justify both the terms and 
analysis it uses,” the identification of suspect classes will become incoherent). 
255 David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1265; see also, e.g., 
Baker, supra note 120, at 1051; Powell, supra note 127, at 1091 (“One reasonably may doubt the capacity of 
courts to . . . determine which groups—at a given time and place—operate effectively within our politics.”); 
Schacter, supra note 76, at 1392. 
256 See supra Section II.A. 
257 Another study examines how often different groups of voters cast ballots for losing candidates at all 
levels of government. See Zoltan L. Hajnal, Who Loses in American Democracy? A Count of Votes 
Demonstrates the Limited Representation of African Americans, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 37 (2009). It finds that 
blacks are the group most likely to support losing candidates. I do not discuss this approach further because it 
too deals with an aspect of democracy other than policy enactment. 
37                              Political Powerlessness 
 
 
 
suspicious by the Court (i.e., race and gender), proceeding to classifications often 
urged to be added to the suspect list (i.e., sexuality and income), and concluding 
with a pair of additional categories (i.e., age and education). For each study, I 
discuss its key findings while also highlighting its limitations. 
 
A. Race 
 
The most important work on different racial groups’ clout has been carried 
out by John Griffin and Brian Newman. In their book, Minority Report,258 and in 
a series of studies,259 they have investigated both the likelihood that racial 
groups’ policy preferences will be enacted and various aspects of racial 
representation in Congress. While their methods do not allow them to capture my 
notion of powerlessness, their results are still illuminating.  
As to policy enactment, Griffin and Newman used long-running opinion 
surveys to determine racial groups’ views on whether federal spending should 
increase or decrease in six areas: national defense, the environment, education, 
foreign aid, aid to major cities, and the space program.260 They then compared the 
groups’ views to the changes in spending that actually took place.261 This 
approach is imperfect because it addresses only a fraction of all federal activity, 
fails to control for group size, and overlooks the extent to which the status quo 
already reflects groups’ preferences. Nevertheless, it shows that, on the covered 
issues, blacks and Hispanics’ opinions are substantially less likely to be heeded 
than whites’.262 Spending on a given item is more apt to decrease when blacks 
and Hispanics favor a rise, and more apt to increase when they favor a fall.263 
This is probative (though hardly dispositive) evidence that blacks and Hispanics 
are relatively powerless.264 
As to representation, Griffin and Newman measured racial groups’ 
ideologies using another major survey,265 and Congress members’ positions using 
roll call votes.266 They then estimated the members’ proximity and 
responsiveness to their constituents by racial group, controlling for group size.267 
                                                 
258 See JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY REPORT: EVALUATING POLITICAL EQUALITY IN 
AMERICA (2008). 
259 See John D. Griffin, When and Why Minority Legislators Matter, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 327 (2014); 
John D. Griffin & Patrick Flavin, Racial Differences in Information, Expectations, and Accountability, 69 J. 
POL. 220 (2007); John D. Griffin & Michael Keane, Are African Americans Effectively Represented in 
Congress?, 64 POL. RES. Q. 145 (2011); John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, The Unequal Representation of 
Latinos and Whites, 69 J. POL. 1032 (2007). 
260 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 63-64. 
261 See id. at 64-69. 
262 See id. 
263 See id. More specifically, blacks are less likely to be “winners” in four of six areas, and more likely to 
be “big losers” in three of six areas. Hispanics are less likely to be “winners” in three of six areas, and more 
likely to be “big losers” in two of six areas. See id. 
264 A study confirming racial minorities’ lack of policy success, in the very different context of direct 
democracy, is Hajnal et al., supra note 186. It found that blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans all are more 
likely than whites to end up on the losing side of voter initiatives. See id. at 162-63. 
265 See id. at 82-83 (discussing National Annenberg Election Survey). 
266 See id. at 81-82 (discussing W-Nominate scores computed using all non-unanimous roll call votes). 
267 See id. at 96, 104, 107, 109 (presenting charts and models controlling for group size). 
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Representation, again, is tied only loosely to enacted policy, and Griffin and 
Newman’s size controls were suboptimal too.268 Their results, though, 
consistently indicated that black and Hispanic voters wield less influence than 
whites over their legislators. House members and senators are farther 
ideologically from their minority constituents, irrespective of the racial makeup 
of their district or state.269 Similarly, in models including the population shares of 
minorities, legislators are markedly less responsive to their views.270 These 
findings also support (but do not compel) a conclusion of black and Hispanic 
powerlessness. 
Griffin and Newman ran several more analyses of representation in which 
they made no effort to control for racial group size.271 Christopher Ellis has done 
the same in another study.272 Because these analyses deviate even further from 
the ideal approach, I note only that they too found that blacks and Hispanics are 
underrepresented relative to whites,273 and do not dwell further on their results. 
(Later in this Part, in the absence of more relevant studies, I pay closer attention 
to work lacking any size controls.274) 
 
B. Gender 
 
Griffin, Newman, and Christina Wolbrecht also have authored the only study 
on how representation varies by constituents’ gender.275 As in their racial work, 
they estimated constituent-legislator proximity using survey responses and roll 
call votes.276 In addition, they computed constituents’ “win ratios” by comparing 
their preferences on specific bills to their legislators’ votes on the same items.277 
These techniques, once more, bear little relevance to actual policy enactment and 
do not control explicitly for group size.278 But they show that women are 
substantially underrepresented relative to men, in terms of both proximity and 
                                                 
268 Rather than include group size as an actual control in their proximity analyses, Griffin and Newman 
calculated proximity separately for districts and states in different racial percentage bands. See id. at 96, 104. 
They also did not include white population share in their senator responsiveness model. See id. at 107. Their 
House member responsiveness model, though, did control properly for group size. See id. at 109.  
269 See id. at 96, 104 (showing racial gaps in proximity of five to forty points for districts, and four to 
twelve points for states). 
270 See id. at 107 (finding that black and Hispanic opinion have impact indistinguishable from zero on 
senators’ voting records); id. at 109 (finding that white opinion has impact more than twice as large as black or 
Hispanic opinion on House members’ voting records). 
271 See id. at 85 (senator responsiveness model); id. at 93 (House member proximity chart); Griffin & 
Flavin, supra note 259, at 225-26 (House member proximity model); Griffin & Newman, supra note 259, at 
1032 (same). 
272 See Christopher Ellis, Understanding Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and 
Policy Representation in the 110th House, 65 PUB. RESEARCH Q. 938, 943-44 (2012). 
273 See supra notes 271-272. 
274 See infra Section III.E. 
275 See John D. Griffin et al., A Gender Gap in Policy Representation in the U.S. Congress?, 37 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 35 (2012). 
276 See id. at 44-45. 
277 See id. at 42-44. 
278 Though they do control for it implicitly since men and women make up about equal shares of the 
population. See id. at 37 (“[W]e might also want to know whether two groups of relatively equal size are 
represented equally.”). 
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win ratios, when their legislators are Republicans or there is a Republican House 
majority.279 In contrast, women enjoy a representational advantage (albeit a 
smaller one) when their legislators are Democrats or there is a Democratic House 
majority.280 These results suggest that women’s political influence is mediated by 
partisan forces. It waxes when Democrats are ascendant and wanes when 
Republicans are the dominant party. 
Three further studies by Griffin and Newman have presented data on gender 
representation while focusing on other matters. They found that, relative to men, 
women are more ideologically distant from their House members281 and have 
lower legislative win ratios.282 These disparities, which do not take party into 
account, are consistent with the above conclusion that women are sharply 
underrepresented by Republicans and mildly overrepresented by Democrats. 
Modest overall shortfalls seem to mask wider partisan variations. 
 
C. Sexual Orientation 
 
Next, gays’ policy preferences cannot be ascertained in the same manner as 
racial minorities’ or women’s. Their share of the population is too small for their 
views to be gauged accurately by most surveys, especially at subnational levels. 
It thus is impossible to compare their opinions directly with actual policy 
outcomes or legislators’ voting records.283 But it is possible, as Jeffrey Lax, 
Justin Phillips, and Katherine Krimmel have demonstrated, to assess gays’ 
influence in other ways.284 These scholars used a cutting-edge technique to 
estimate the entire public’s views on various gay rights issues: adoption, 
marriage, military service, anti-discrimination legislation, and so on.285 They then 
paired these views with policy outcomes at the state level and Congress 
members’ votes at the federal level.286 As a result, they were able to determine 
how congruent the outcomes and the votes are with public opinion as a whole.  
                                                 
279 Specifically, women are 0.083 points farther than men from their House member when represented by 
a Republican, and 0.012 points farther when there is a Republican House majority. And women’s win ratio is 
3.7 points lower than men’s when represented by a Republican, and 1.5 points lower when there is a Republican 
House majority. See id. at 47-52. 
280 Specifically, women are 0.091 points closer than men to their House member when represented by a 
Democrat, and 0.009 points closer when there is a Democratic House majority. And women’s win ratio is 1.7 
points higher than men’s when represented by a Democrat, and 0.8 points higher when there is a Democratic 
House majority. See id. 
281 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 94 (showing two-point gap in ideological proximity by 
gender); Griffin & Newman, supra note 259, at 1038 (same). 
282 See John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Voting Power, Policy Representation, and Disparities in 
Voting’s Rewards, 75 J. POL. 52, 57 (2013) (showing win ratio gap by gender of less than one point).  
283 This is why sexual orientation is not one of the categories I consider in Part IV, infra. 
284 See Katherine L. Krimmel et al., Public Opinion and Gay Rights: Do Members of Congress Follow 
Their Constituents’ Preferences? (Mar. 30, 2011); Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: 
Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367 (2009). 
285 This technique is multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP), which allows opinion estimates 
for geographic subunits to be computed from a single, moderately sized national survey. See Krimmel et al., 
supra note 284, at 6-7; Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 371-72. 
286 See Krimmel et al., supra note 284, at 7-9; Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 372. 
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This approach, of course, suffers from both its lack of data on gays’ own 
preferences and its coverage of gay rights issues alone. Nevertheless, it reveals a 
persistent bias, at both the state and federal levels, in an anti-gay direction. At the 
state level, most pro-gay policies do not become likely to be adopted until they 
are backed by more than a majority of the population.287 In fact, it typically takes 
close to two-thirds support before half of a suite of pro-gay policies are passed.288 
Similarly, at the federal level, most members of Congress need more than 
majority support among their constituents before they become willing to cast a 
pro-gay vote.289 Of the many instances in which legislators contravened their 
constituents’ preferences, fully three-fourths arose due to anti-gay votes when the 
public favored a pro-gay stance.290 Consequently, as Lax and Phillips put it, 
“representative institutions do a poor job protecting [gay] rights even when the 
public supports the pro[gay] position.”291 This is not quite what I mean by 
powerlessness, but it is not too far either. 
 
D. Income 
 
Almost exactly what I mean by powerlessness, though, has been captured by 
several income group studies. The most significant of these is Gilens’s 2012 
book, Affluence and Influence.292 In it, he compiled answers to more than two 
thousand survey questions from 1981 to 2006, all asking whether respondents 
favored certain policy changes at the federal level.293 The questions spanned a 
wide range of topics and addressed many sorts of shifts to the status quo, in many 
sorts of ideological directions.294 Gilens then used the answers to estimate the 
preferences of respondents at the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth income percentiles 
on all covered issues.295 Lastly, he painstakingly tracked whether each policy 
                                                 
287 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 373 (showing logistic regression plots for various policies); see 
also Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 156 
(2012) (same); id. at 154 (also showing that gay rights issues have largest and most conservative incongruence 
bias of any policy area). 
288 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 373 (showing logistic regression plot for index of all eight 
policies). 
289 See Krimmel et al., supra note 284, at 34 (showing logistic regression plots for various congressional 
votes). 
290 See id. at 12. 
291 Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 383. 
292 See GILENS, supra note 42. Gilens also addressed these issues, albeit less extensively, in earlier work. 
See Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 778 (2005). And he has 
continued to probe them since publishing Affluence and Influence. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, 
Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (Apr. 9, 2014). 
293 See GILENS, supra note 42, at 57-60. 
294 In Gilens’s database, the questions are sorted into the following categories: budget, campaign finance, 
civil rights, defense, economy and labor, education, environment, foreign policy, government reform, guns, 
health, immigration, race, religion, social welfare, taxation, terrorism, and welfare. Because the questions all ask 
about policy changes, a group may appear weak if it is largely content with the status quo but prefers a policy 
that fails to be enacted. On the other hand, such a group may appear strong if it opposes a policy that ultimately 
does not become law. A more sophisticated survey might ignore the status quo and simply ask whether various 
potential policies are favored. The answers then could be compared with the policies actually in effect. 
295 See id. at 61-62. 
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asked about by a survey actually was adopted by the federal government during 
the next four years.296 
This approach is well suited to assessing powerlessness because it examines 
policy enactment in the aggregate and controls for group size and type.297 (It is 
not flawless, though, because the survey questions did not ask respondents about 
the intensity of their preferences.298) The method also produces some fairly 
startling results. With respect to issues on which income groups disagree, federal 
policy outcomes are highly responsive to the views of respondents at the 
ninetieth percentile. As their support for a given measure increases, the 
likelihood of the measure’s adoption increases steadily as well.299 But federal 
policy outcomes are entirely non-responsive to the views of respondents at the 
tenth or fiftieth percentiles.300 In Gilens’s words, “when preferences between the 
well-off and the poor [or middle-class] diverge, government policy bears 
absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor 
[or middle-class].”301 
Gilens’s findings at the federal level have been extended to the states by 
Patrick Flavin302 and Elizabeth Rigby and Gerald Wright.303 These scholars used 
survey data to determine income groups’ policy preferences—in the aggregate in 
Flavin’s case,304 and split into economic and social subsets in Rigby and 
Wright’s.305 They also obtained policy outcome information from databases 
assembled by Sorens and others (again in the aggregate in Flavin’s case,306 and 
subdivided economically and socially in Rigby and Wright’s307). Lastly, they ran 
models with policy outcomes as the dependent variables and income groups’ 
preferences as the key independent variables, controlling explicitly for group 
size.308 
                                                 
296 See id. at 62-66. 
297 The group type is income, of course, and each income percentile captures a particular spot in the 
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percentile. 
298 The questions also often did not provide as much information as one might like about links or tradeoffs 
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299 See id. at 80. Specifically, as the share of respondents at the ninetieth percentile favoring a policy rises 
from 10% to 90%, the odds of the policy’s enactment rise from 10% to 50%. 
300 See id. For respondents at both of these percentiles, the odds of a policy’s enactment stay constant at 
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301 See id. at 81. 
302 See Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States, 40 AM. POL. 
RES. 29 (2011). 
303 See Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Whose Statehouse Democracy? Policy Responsiveness to 
Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor Versus Rich States, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED 89 (Peter K. Enns & 
Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011). 
304 See Flavin, supra note 302, at 35-37. 
305 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 303, at 194-95. 
306 See Flavin, supra note 302, at 40, 43 (considering policy databases assembled by Erikson et al., Gray et 
al., and Sorens et al.). 
307 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 303, at 195, 199 (splitting Sorens database into economic and social 
categories). 
308 See Flavin, supra note 302, at 41; Rigby & Wright, supra note 303, at 207. 
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This methodology is near optimal from this Article’s perspective (though it 
too does not take preference intensity into account directly). And it shows that 
the poor have next to no influence over state policy either. In all of Flavin’s 
models, spanning three databases and two eras, the preferences of the low-
income group have an impact indistinguishable from zero on aggregate policy 
outcomes (compared to significant impacts for middle- and high-income 
preferences).309 Similarly, in three out of Rigby and Wright’s four models, the 
views of the low-income group have no effect on state economic or social policy 
(while middle- and high-income opinions have a substantial effect).310 These 
results, in conjunction with Gilens’s, are a clear sign that powerlessness can be 
quantified—and that, if any group is powerless, it is the poor. 
Several additional studies have tackled differential representation by income 
group (most notably Larry Bartels’s 2008 book, Unequal Democracy, which 
launched this field of inquiry).311 Their findings are that both House members 
and senators are more ideologically distant from, and less ideologically 
responsive to, their low-income constituents.312 Since this work does not relate 
directly to policy enactment, I do not discuss it further, except to point out its 
consistency with the more relevant literature. 
 
E. Other 
 
Two final classifications, age and education, have not yet been the subjects 
of full-length treatments, but have been addressed in passing by a number of 
studies. As to age, Griffin and Newman found that respondents under thirty-five 
are farther ideologically from their House members than respondents over fifty-
five.313 Similarly, as to education, Ellis, Griffin, and Newman found that 
respondents with a high school diploma are farther ideologically from their 
House members, and have lower legislative win ratios, than respondents with a 
college degree.314 Once again, these are analyses of representation rather than 
enacted policy, which fail to control for group size to boot. But they still imply 
that the young and the uneducated have less political sway than the old and the 
educated. 
                                                 
309 See Flavin, supra note 302, at 42. 
310 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 303, at 208-09, 213-14. The one exception is the model for social 
policy in 2004, in which the views of the middle-income group have the least influence. See id. at 214. 
311 See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 
259-62 (2008); Christopher Ellis, Social Context and Economic Biases in Representation, 75 J. POL. 773, 779 
(2013); Ellis, supra note 272, at 943; Jesse H. Rhodes & Brian F. Schaffner, Economic Inequality and 
Representation in the U.S. House: A New Approach Using Population-Level Data 29 (Apr. 7, 2013); Chris 
Tausanovitch, Income and Representation in the United States Congress 22 (2014); see also Ross & Li, supra 
note 54 (manuscript at 40-41) (finding no link between share of poor in House district and House member’s 
likelihood of support pro-poor legislation). I discuss this work in more detail in Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, 
Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 33-38). 
312 See id. 
313 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 94 (showing eight-point proximity gap between these 
groups); Griffin & Newman, supra note 259, at 1038 (same). 
314 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 94 (showing four-point proximity gap between these 
groups); Griffin & Newman, supra note 259, at 1038 (same); see also Ellis, supra note 272, at 944 (showing 
two-point ideological distance gap and one-point win ratio gap between these groups). 
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To conclude, then, the existing scholarship on group influence is suggestive 
but only partially applicable. Substantively, it hints that racial minorities, women, 
gays, the poor, the young, and the uneducated may be relatively powerless in my 
sense of the term. But methodologically, none of these intimations can be taken 
too seriously—except as to the poor—because they arise from studies that are 
flawed in one respect or another. In the next Part, I try to rectify these 
shortcomings. I borrow the best available techniques from the income group 
literature, and then apply them to a host of additional classifications and datasets. 
The result, in my view, is the strongest proof to date that powerlessness is 
amenable to measurement and application. 
 
IV. NEW EMPIRICS 
 
I carry out my empirical analysis at both the federal and state levels. At the 
federal level, I use Gilens’s database of survey responses and policy outcomes, 
and I largely replicate his work—only for groups defined not just by income, but 
also by race, gender, and religion. I find that whites’ preferences are more likely 
to be adopted by the national government than blacks’ and Hispanics’; that men’s 
views are more impactful than women’s; and that all denominations’ opinions are 
about equally influential. 
At the state level, I gauge voters’ preferences using exit polls from 2000 to 
2010, and enacted policy using an index constructed by Sorens. I then run the 
same models that have gained wide acceptance in the income group literature, 
including interactions between group opinion and group size as well as additional 
group size controls. I again find that state policy is more responsive to the views 
of whites and men, respectively, than to those of racial minorities and women. I 
also find that state policy is more responsive to the wealthy and the middle-class 
than to the poor, and to urban and suburban residents than to rural dwellers. But 
there do not seem to be significant differences in responsiveness by age, 
education, or religion group. 
That there exist models tailored to measuring powerlessness is evidence of 
the concept’s workability. Still more encouraging, in this regard, is the 
consistency of the federal and state findings despite their use of completely 
different data. As a doctrinal matter, the results suggest that racial minorities and 
women should keep their suspect status because they remain relatively 
powerless.315 Analogously, no age or education group appears so weak that 
heightened judicial protection should be extended to it. But there is a strong 
clout-based case for suspect status for the poor and for rural dwellers, both of 
whom lack sufficient sway relative to other income and residence groups. And 
there also is reason to reconsider the extra judicial attention afforded to religious 
minorities, none of which is particularly impotent. 
 
                                                 
315 Though, as explained in Section IV.C, infra, the case for blacks remaining a suspect class is stronger 
than the case for Hispanics. 
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A. Federal Level 
 
As noted earlier, Gilens’s remarkable database includes information on 
different income groups’ preferences on more than two thousand issues from 
1981 to 2006.316 Gilens used this information, along with records of whether the 
policies referred to by the surveys in fact were enacted, to conduct his income 
group analysis.317 But his database sheds light on more than income groups’ 
views. Each entry also specifies how many respondents of each race, gender, and 
religion favored the policy, and how many opposed it.318 These tallies allowed 
me to compute, for each policy, the level of support of each race, gender, and 
religion group.319  
With these estimates in hand, I proceeded to run slightly adapted versions of 
Gilens’s models. Like Gilens, I used as my dependent variable whether a policy 
was adopted by the federal government during the four years following a 
survey.320 Also like Gilens, I examined two groups at a time, considered only 
issues on which their preferences diverged by at least ten percentage points, and 
was unable to adjust for preference intensity.321 But, unlike Gilens, I controlled 
explicitly for group size in all of my models.322 I included, for each group, an 
interaction term multiplying its support level by its share of the population, as 
                                                 
316 See supra notes 292-301 and accompanying text; see also GILENS, supra note 42, at 57-60. 
317 See id. 
318 Gilens’s database is on file with the author. Each entry also states how many respondents answered 
“don’t know.” I omit these responses from my analysis. The database further breaks down respondents by 
region of the country and by union membership. Because these are not classifications that have been urged to be 
made suspect, I do not consider them further. 
319 I simply divided the number of each group’s respondents favoring a given policy by the total number of 
the group’s respondents favoring or opposing the policy. For example, if 300 blacks favored a particular policy 
and 200 opposed it, black support for the policy was 60%. 
320 See GILENS, supra note 42, at 75-85. In sum, about one-third of the policies in the database were 
enacted in this timeframe. See id. at 63. 
321 See id. at 77-85. Only two groups at a time can be examined since it is the groups’ opinion differences 
that determine which issues will be included in the analysis in the first place. And Gilens’s rationale for 
focusing on issues on which groups disagree is that, otherwise, a group may appear influential simply because it 
agrees with the group that actually shapes policy. See id. at 78. Under my conception of group power, it 
arguably is irrelevant that a group’s preferences may have been heeded only because they overlapped with those 
of another group. See supra Section II.A. Nevertheless, I adopt Gilens’s approach here for the sake of 
comparability with his landmark work. It also makes little substantive difference whether only issues on which 
groups disagree, or all issues, are included in the analysis. Either way the results for different groups’ clout are 
extremely similar.  
322 As noted earlier, Gilens controlled implicitly for group size. See supra note 297. Gilens’s database also 
did not include population share information for any groups. I obtained data on race from Population Estimates, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/national/nat2010.html (last visited Feb. 
1, 2015) [hereinafter Population Estimates], and Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on 
Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For The United States, 
Regions, Divisions, and States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2002), http://www.census.gov/population/ 
www/documentation/twps0056/twps0056.html; data on gender from Population Estimates, supra, and FRANK 
HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY (Nov. 2002), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf; and data on religion from Subject Index, GEN. SOC. 
SURVEY, http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/Subject+Index/ (last visited Feb. 2, 
2015) (follow links to R, Religion, R’s Religious Preference, Respondent (Current), Rs Religious Preference, 
and Trends). Of course, these controls only capture temporal variation in group size, which is substantial but not 
overwhelming over the twenty-five year period in question. 
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well as its population share separately.323 This is the approach recommended by 
Flavin, Rigby and Wright, and several other political scientists.324 It weights each 
group’s preferences by its size, while leaving open the possibility that group size 
may have an independent effect on policy enactment. It thus permits very nearly 
my conception of powerlessness to be quantified. 
Beginning with race, I ran separate models for whites and blacks, and whites 
and Hispanics. (There were too few Asian American respondents in most surveys 
for their views to be determined accurately.325) In the white and black model, 
first, the coefficient for white policy support (weighted by white population 
share) is positive and statistically significant.326 This indicates that, as white 
support for a policy increases, the odds of the policy’s enactment increase as 
well. On the other hand, the coefficient for black policy support (weighted by 
black population share) is negative and statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.327 This means that, as black support for a policy rises, the likelihood of the 
policy’s adoption stays constant at best, and in fact may decline somewhat. 
These results are illustrated graphically in Figure 1’s first panel. The chart 
shows how the odds of policy enactment change as white support and black 
support for a policy vary from 0% to 100%, holding all other variables at their 
means.328 As white support increases from 0% to 100%, the likelihood of 
adoption increases from about 10% to about 60%. As black support rises from 
0% to 100%, though, the odds of enactment fall from roughly 40% to roughly 
30%. Federal policy outcomes thus are highly responsive to the preferences of 
whites, but wholly non-responsive (or even negatively responsive) to those of 
blacks. 
The white and Hispanic model yields similar outputs. Again, the coefficient 
for size-weighted white policy support is positive and statistically significant.329 
                                                 
323 More formally, each model I ran was a logit regression of the form: P = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝜋𝑔1𝜎𝑔1) + 𝛽2(𝜋𝑔2𝜎𝑔2) 
+ 𝛽3𝜎𝑔1 + 𝛽4𝜎𝑔2 + 𝜀. P indicates whether each policy was enacted within four years of the survey that asked 
about it, 𝜋 is a group’s level of support for a policy, and 𝜎 is a group’s share of the population. It also would be 
reasonable to include group preference (that is, 𝜋) separately in the model. However, the existing literature has 
not done so, see infra note 324, and I do not either for the sake of comparability. But in results not reported 
here, I find that it makes little substantive difference whether group preference is included separately in the 
specification. 
324 See Flavin, supra note 302, at 41 (specifying same models as those used here); Rigby & Wright, supra 
note 303, at 207 (same); see also, e.g., Yosef Bhatti & Robert S. Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor 
Represented in the U.S. Senate?, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED, supra note 303, at 223, 230 (same, and also 
explaining that groups’ population shares must be included separately in models to avoid odd results); 
Tausanovitch, supra note 311, at 11 (same). 
325 The median survey included only 10 Asian American respondents, compared to 862 whites, 105 
blacks, and 55 Hispanics. 
326 All regression results are in the Appendix. See infra appx. tbl.1. I only discuss the coefficients for size-
weighted policy support because the coefficients for group size, which represent its impact on the likelihood of 
policy adoption when group policy support is zero, are not substantively interesting. See Bear F. Braumoeller, 
Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms, 58 INT’L ORG. 807, 807-11 (2004) (noting difficulty of 
interpreting lower-order coefficients in model with interaction term). 
327 See id. The coefficient actually is significant at the 10% level, but I use the customary 5% threshold 
here. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for white and black policy support are different (p=0.01). 
328 It is not possible to produce this chart with size-weighted policy support (i.e., the interaction term in the 
models) on the x-axis. This is because group size cannot be held constant at its mean as size-weighted policy 
support varies. Group size obviously is part of the interaction term. 
329 See id. 
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And again, the coefficient for size-weighted Hispanic policy support is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.330 As shown in Figure 1’s second panel, 
the odds of policy enactment increase from about 10% to about 55% as white 
support rises from 0% to 100%. But the likelihood of adoption holds steady at 
roughly 30% as Hispanic support varies over the same range. Hispanics therefore 
have little sway over federal policy either, in contrast to the considerable 
influence enjoyed by whites. 
Second, for gender, I ran a single model for men and women. The coefficient 
for size-weighted male policy support is positive and statistically significant.331 
Conversely, the coefficient for size-weighted female policy support is negative 
and significant.332 The inference that federal policy is positively responsive to 
men’s preferences, but negatively responsive to women’s, is confirmed by Figure 
1’s third panel. As male support increases from 0% to 100%, the odds of policy 
enactment rise from about 0% to about 90%. But as female support varies over 
the same range, the likelihood of adoption falls from roughly 80% to roughly 
10%. When men and women disagree, then, stronger female backing for a policy 
seems entirely futile. 
Third, for religion, I ran separate models for Protestants and Catholics, and 
Protestants and non-religious people. (Many surveys also identified Jewish 
respondents, but their numbers usually were too small for their opinion estimates 
to be reliable.333) In the Protestant and Catholic model, there are few cases in 
which the groups’ preferences diverge by more than ten points,334 and neither 
coefficient for size-weighted policy support is statistically significant.335 Not 
surprisingly, Figure 1’s fourth panel paints a blurry picture too. The odds of 
policy enactment barely budge as Protestant support increases from 0% to 100%, 
and they decline as Catholic support varies over the same range. At least over 
this small set of cases, neither denomination appears especially influential. 
Nor, over a somewhat larger sample size,336 do Protestants or non-religious 
people. In the model for these groups, neither coefficient for size-weighted policy 
support rises to the level of statistical significance.337 Similarly, in Figure 1’s fifth 
panel, the likelihood of policy adoption increases only modestly, from about 25% 
to about 45%, as Protestant support rises from 0% to 100%. And the odds of 
                                                 
330 See id. However, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for white and Hispanic 
policy support are different (p=0.45). 
331 See id. Female population share is omitted from the model because it is perfectly collinear with male 
population share. 
332 See id. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for male and female policy support are different 
(p=0.00). 
333 The median survey included only 9 Jewish respondents, compared to 283 Protestants, 134 Catholics, 
and 30 non-religious people. 
334 Specifically, there are 46 such cases out of the 903 surveys that include information on both 
Protestants’ and Catholics’ preferences. The regression results in the Appendix provide the sample size for each 
model. See id. 
335 See id. Predictably, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for Protestant and 
Catholic policy support are different (p=0.44). 
336 There are 297 cases in which Protestants’ and non-religious people’s views diverge by at least ten 
points. 
337 See id. Again, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for Protestant and secular 
policy support are different (p=0.85). 
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enactment are even less responsive to non-religious people’s views, increasing 
from roughly 30% to roughly 40% as their support varies over the same range. 
Lastly, I updated Gilens’s income group analysis by including surveys up to 
2006 (rather than 2002).338 Like Gilens, I did not control explicitly for group size, 
since each income percentile is always at the same spot in the distribution.339 And 
like Gilens, I ran separate models for the tenth and ninetieth income percentiles, 
and the fiftieth and ninetieth income percentiles.340 In the first of these models, 
the coefficient for policy support at the ninetieth percentile is positive and 
statistically significant, while the coefficient for policy support at the tenth 
percentile is negative and significant.341 Consistent with this finding, Figure 1’s 
sixth panel shows that, as support at the ninetieth percentile increases from 0% to 
100%, the odds of policy enactment rise from about 10% to about 70%. But as 
support at the tenth percentile varies over the same range, the likelihood falls 
from roughly 50% to roughly 20%. 
The results of the model for the fiftieth and ninetieth income percentiles are 
largely equivalent. The coefficient for policy support at the ninetieth percentile 
again is positive and statistically significant.342 This time, though, the coefficient 
for policy support at the fiftieth percentile is negative, but just below the 
threshold for statistical significance.343 In Figure 1’s seventh panel, the odds of 
policy enactment increase from about 10% to about 70% as support at the 
ninetieth percentile rises from 0% to 100%. But the likelihood declines from 
roughly 50% to roughly 20% as support at the fiftieth percentile varies over the 
same range. This chart is virtually identical to the one for the tenth and ninetieth 
income percentiles.344 
Gilens’s database, then, is extremely useful because it allows group power to 
be assessed at the federal level, considering policy in the aggregate and 
controlling for group size and type. But the federal level is not the only one in 
our complicated system. It remains possible that a group that is powerless as to 
national policy wields significant influence as to state policy, or vice versa. And 
how a group fares as to state policy matters legally. If an overarching 
determination of powerlessness is to be made for each group, taking into account 
clout at each governmental level, then the states cannot be ignored.345 This is why 
I turn to them next.  
 
                                                 
338 See GILENS, supra note 42, at 255 (including only surveys up to 2002 in income group analysis). 
339 See supra notes 297, 322 and accompanying text. 
340 See GILENS, supra note 42, at 254-55. 
341 See appx. tbl.1. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for tenth and ninetieth percentile policy 
support are different (p=0.00). 
342 See id. 
343 See id. It is significant at the 10% level but not at the 5% level. Again, a Wald test confirms that the 
coefficients for fiftieth and ninetieth percentile policy support are different (p=0.00). 
344 In Gilens’s analogous charts, federal policy appears non-responsive rather than negatively responsive to 
the preferences of the tenth and fiftieth income percentiles. See GILENS, supra note 42, at 80. The likely 
explanation for the disparity is that Gilens did not hold all other variables at their means as he varied each 
group’s policy support. Instead, he simply plotted predicted probability of policy change versus percent 
favoring change for each group. See id. 
345 See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 1: PREDICTED LIKELIHOOD OF FEDERAL POLICY CHANGE VERSUS 
GROUP SUPPORT FOR POLICY CHANGE 
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B. State Level 
 
In the last few years, scholars have deployed a new technique to estimate 
public opinion in the states using national surveys.346 Unfortunately, this 
procedure has been carried out for fewer than fifty individual issues, compared to 
the more than two thousand in Gilens’s database.347 Also regrettably, the 
procedure has been used primarily to determine the views of state populations in 
their entirety.348 The opinions of state subgroups rarely have been calculated—
and, indeed, usually cannot be calculated because of the relatively small sample 
sizes of most national surveys.349 It thus is impossible, at present, to repeat 
Gilens’s analysis at the state level. The necessary data on subgroups’ preferences 
by issue simply does not exist. 
In the absence of issue-specific data, I obtained access to the general election 
exit polls collected by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.350 These 
polls are conducted in most states every two years, and they have a number of 
properties that make them well-suited to the estimation of subgroups’ views. 
First, their collective sample size is enormous. The 208 polls that I used for this 
study, spanning the 2000-2010 period, had a total of more than 300,000 
respondents.351 Second, unlike most national surveys, exit polls are designed to 
have representative samples at the state level.352 Their whole point, after all, is to 
appraise accurately the states’ respective political environments.  
                                                 
346 This technique, again, is MRP. See supra note 285; see also, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas 
M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After 
Shelby County, 102 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 33-37); Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher 
Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POL. 
330, 333-36 (2013). 
347 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 287, at 154 (estimating state public opinion on thirty-nine issues in 
largest study of its kind). 
348 The procedure also has been used to determine the views of district and city populations, again in their 
entirety. See Krimmel et al., supra note 284, at 6-9 (congressional districts); Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra 
note 346, at 333-36 (cities and districts). But see Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 346, at 37-43 (calculating 
levels of anti-black stereotyping for nonblack respondents by state and county); Christopher S. Elmendorf & 
Douglas M. Spencer, After Shelby County: Getting Section 2 to Do the Work of Section 5, at 49-58 (Mar. 2014) 
(calculating ideal points for white, black, Hispanic, and Asian respondents by county). 
349 Even scholars who have had access to very large national surveys typically have collapsed respondents’ 
individual answers into a single left-right ideological dimension. See, e.g., Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra 
note 346, at 332. 
350 See Exit Poll Database, supra note 44. My thanks to the Roper Center for granting me access to these 
polls. I did not use primary exit polls because their respondents are representative of the primary rather than the 
general electorate. And I did not use national election day exit polls because their respondents are 
representative of the country as a whole, not of individual states. Moreover, the national exit poll is compiled 
from respondents to the state exit polls, so using it would have meant double-counting these people. 
351 Cf. Barbara Norrander & Sylvia Manzano, Minority Group Opinion in the U.S. States, 10 STATE POL. 
& POL’Y Q. 446, 452 (2010) (also assembling database of more than 300,000 respondents using 1996-2006 exit 
polls); Julianna Pacheco, Using National Surveys to Measure Dynamic U.S. State Public Opinion: A Guideline 
for Scholars and an Application, 11 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 415, 430 (2011) (“State exit polls overcome the 
measurement challenges of national surveys by . . . typically interviewing hundreds of state residents, regardless 
of state size.”). 
Norrander graciously provided me with equivalent data from the 1996-2008 period. Using it in all of my 
models instead of the 2000-2010 data made essentially no substantive difference. The robustness of the results 
to data from different (albeit overlapping) periods is highly encouraging. 
352 See Norrander & Manzano, supra note 351, at 453-54 (discussing elaborate procedures used to ensure 
representativeness of state exit polls’ respondents). Norrander and Manzano criticize Griffin and Newman for 
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Third, all of the exit polls in this period asked respondents about their 
ideologies. Specifically, they posed the question, “On most political matters, do 
you consider yourself: Liberal, Moderate, or Conservative?” This question is not 
as fine-grained as one might like,353 but its ubiquity compensates for its 
bluntness. And fourth, by probing general beliefs rather than individual policies, 
the polls largely avoided the problem of preference intensity. While it is 
reasonable (though not yet feasible) to weight issues by how much respondents 
care about them,354 it would seem to violate basic egalitarian norms to weight 
people differently based on the strength of their ideologies. 
After amassing this vast pool of exit poll respondents, I computed their 
average ideologies by state and then by subgroup.355 Following the lead of other 
scholars, I assigned values of 1 to “Liberal” answers, 0 to “Moderate” answers, 
and -1 to “Conservative” answers.356 For classifications, I used both the four that 
I covered in my federal analysis (race, gender, religion, and income) and three 
additional ones (age, education, and residence).357 While other works have 
estimated racial and income group ideology by state,358 this is the first study to 
tackle the remaining categories. 
With respect to enacted policy, information does exist on each state’s laws on 
a host of topics. The database compiled by Sorens, in particular, lists each state’s 
policy in more than 200 areas (updated biannually to boot).359 This material is 
overkill for present purposes, since equally detailed public opinion data is 
unavailable. Fortunately, though, Sorens used principal components analysis to 
collapse all of the individual policies into a single index of state policy 
liberalism.360 Positive scores on this measure indicate state policy that is more 
                                                                                                                         
estimating state subgroups’ views using national surveys whose state samples likely were unrepresentative. See 
id. at 452. They also argue that the disaggregation of exit poll data is superior to the application of MRP to 
national surveys, due to the greater sensitivity of the former approach to differences among states. See id. at 
453.  
353 In contrast, the National Annenberg Election Survey used a five-point ideology scale, see GRIFFIN & 
NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 42, and the American National Election Study used a seven-point scale, see Bhatti 
& Erikson, supra note 324, at 228.  
354 See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text. 
355 As recommended both by scholars and by the organization conducting the polls, I incorporated the 
respondents’ weights into all of my calculations. See Norrander & Manzano, supra note 351, at 478 n.3. I also 
derived subgroups’ population shares directly from the exit poll data. This means the shares represent 
subgroups’ proportions of the electorate rather than the general population. See id. at 455. 
356 See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 236; Norrander & Manzano, supra note 351, at 454. These 
scholars actually assigned values of -1 to “Liberal” answers and 1 to “Conservative” answers, but I reversed the 
signs in order to obtain the same ideological orientation as the Sorens index of state policy liberalism. 
357 Gilens’s database does not include residence data, and its age and education data is not interpretable 
without access to the original surveys. 
358 See supra Sections III.A, III.D (discussing relevant literature). 
359 See Sorens Database, supra note 45 (covering 222 policy areas); see also Jason Sorens et al., U.S. State 
and Local Public Policies in 2006: A New Database, 8 STATE POL. & POLY Q. 309, 311-17 (2008) (describing 
compilation of database). 
360 See Sorens et al., supra note 359, at 319-23. They also created a measure of state policy urbanism, 
which I do not consider further because its substantive meaning is unclear, see id. at 322, 324, and because it 
correlates poorly with other scholars’ indices. In addition, I use each state’s average policy liberalism over the 
entire 2000-2010 period covered by the database. 
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liberal overall, while negative scores denote the opposite.361 The measure also 
correlates highly with indices of aggregate state policy created by other 
scholars.362 I thus felt comfortable making it the dependent variable in all of my 
state-level models. 
In these models, I used exactly the same specification as Flavin, Rigby and 
Wright, and several other political scientists.363 That is, I interacted each 
subgroup’s average ideology with its share of the population, while also 
including population share separately so as to allow it to influence policy 
liberalism independently.364 Unlike in my federal analysis, though, I ran a single 
model for each classification rather than for each subgroup pair, and I considered 
all cases rather than just those where subgroups’ ideologies diverged.365 I did so 
in part for the sake of consistency with the existing literature,366 and in part to 
avoid discarding valuable data. With a universe of just fifty states, validity 
concerns would mount if numerous jurisdictions were excluded. The 
consequence of these choices is a bias against findings of statistical significance. 
As Ellis and Joseph Ura have noted, standard errors tend to be inflated when 
policy models include subgroups with similar ideologies.367 Accordingly, any 
significant findings that do emerge should be seen as relatively robust. 
Beginning with the model for race, the coefficient for white ideology 
(weighted by white population share) is positive and statistically significant.368 
This indicates that, as whites become more liberal from one state to another, 
overall state policy also becomes more liberal. On the other hand, the coefficient 
for black ideology (weighted by black population share) is statistically 
                                                 
361 See Sorens Database, supra note 45. Average scores over the 2000-2010 period range from -6.4 
(Wyoming) to 12.8 (California), with a mean of 0.0 (roughly Oregon). 
362 See Sorens et al., supra note 359, at 320 (noting correlations of 0.81 and -0.76 with other scholars’ 
indices); see also Devin Caughey & Christopher Warshaw, Dynamic Representation in the American States, 
1960-2012, at 18 (Aug. 24, 2014) (noting correlation of 0.84 between their index and that of Sorens et al.). 
363 See supra note 324 and accompanying text (describing this specification).  
364 More formally, each model I ran was an OLS regression of the form: L = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝜋𝑔1𝜎𝑔1) + 
𝛽2(𝜋𝑔2𝜎𝑔2) + . . . + 𝛽𝑛(𝜋𝑔𝑛𝜎𝑔𝑛) + 𝛽𝑛+1𝜎𝑔1 + 𝛽𝑛+2𝜎𝑔2 + . . . + 𝛽2𝑛𝜎𝑔𝑛 + 𝜀. L is a state’s overall policy 
liberalism, 𝜋 is a subgroup’s average ideology, and 𝜎 is a subgroup’s share of the electorate. As in the federal 
analysis, it also would be reasonable to include subgroup ideology (that is, 𝜋) separately in the model. But, as 
before, the existing literature has not done so, and doing so makes little substantive difference. 
365 See supra note 321 and accompanying text (describing methods used in federal analysis).  
366 Notably, neither Flavin nor Rigby and Wright omitted states where different income groups’ views 
were too similar. See Flavin, supra note 302, at 42; Rigby & Wright, supra note 303, at 208-09, 213-14. These 
scholars also considered all income groups together, not in pairs. 
367 See Joseph Daniel Ura & Christopher R. Ellis, Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of Policy 
Responsiveness, 4 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 785, 790 (2008) (observing that “standard errors become inflated when 
. . . correlated series are included as predictors simultaneously”); see also GILENS, supra note 42, at 253; Bhatti 
& Erikson, supra note 324, at 235 (explaining that when groups’ ideologies are “more internally correlated,” 
“[t]his results in higher multicollinearity and thus higher standard errors”). Because of the similar ideologies of 
many of the subgroups (and because of their sheer number), I do not report Wald tests in this section. 
368 See infra appx. tbl.2. As in the federal analysis, I omitted Asian Americans because their numbers were 
too small for reliable ideology estimates to be produced. The median number of Asian American respondents 
per state was just 48, compared to 4,673 for whites, 392 for blacks, and 136 for Hispanics. Also as in the federal 
analysis, I only discuss the coefficients for size-weighted ideology because the coefficients for group size, 
which represent its impact on state policy liberalism when group ideology is perfectly moderate, are not 
substantively interesting. See supra note 326. 
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indistinguishable from zero.369 This means that, as blacks become more liberal 
from one state to another, overall state policy does not change appreciably. The 
coefficient for size-weighted Hispanic ideology is positive and statistically 
significant as well.370 As Hispanics become more liberal from state to state, 
overall state policy does so too. 
Figure 2’s first panel provides more information on responsiveness by racial 
group. The chart shows how state policy liberalism changes as white ideology, 
black ideology, and Hispanic ideology vary from the tenth to the ninetieth 
percentiles of their respective distributions, holding all other variables at their 
means.371 As white ideology shifts over this range, state policy liberalism is 
highly responsive, going from about -4 (or roughly Alabama’s policy set) to 
about 4 (or roughly Michigan’s). But as black ideology varies over this span, 
state policy liberalism moves only from about -1 (or roughly Alaska’s policy set) 
to about 1 (or roughly Ohio’s). And as Hispanic ideology goes from its tenth to 
its ninetieth percentile, state policy liberalism changes only from about -2 (or 
roughly Louisiana’s policy set) to about 2 (or roughly Maine’s). 
Second, in the model for gender, the coefficient for size-weighted male 
ideology is positive and statistically significant.372 Conversely, the coefficient for 
size-weighted female ideology is negative and statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.373 The inference that state policy is responsive only to men’s preferences is 
verified by Figure 2’s second panel. As male ideology varies from its tenth to its 
ninetieth percentile, state policy liberalism goes from about -5 (or roughly South 
Dakota’s policy set) to about 6 (or roughly Illinois’s). But as female ideology 
shifts over the same range, state policy liberalism stays almost perfectly constant 
at about 0 (or roughly Oregon’s policy set). 
Third, in the model for religion, none of the coefficients for size-weighted 
ideology rises to the level of statistical significance (though that for Protestants 
comes close).374 Figure 2’s third panel confirms that state policy responsiveness 
does not differ very much by denomination. The slope for Protestant ideology is 
somewhat steeper than the slopes for Catholic ideology and Other Religion 
ideology, which in turn are somewhat steeper than the slope for No Religion 
ideology.375 But these variations in responsiveness are relatively minor—and 
markedly smaller than the gaps by race and gender. 
                                                 
369 See infra appx. tbl.2. 
370 See id. 
371 I use ideology percentile as the x-axis here, rather than ideology itself, to avoid having to make large 
numbers of out-of-sample predictions. In the federal analysis, most subgroups’ levels of support for individual 
policies ranged from near 0% to near 100%. As a result, no heroic assumptions were necessary to estimate the 
likelihood of policy change for all levels of policy support. Here, on the other hand, most subgroups’ ideologies 
vary from state to state by at most 0.5 points on a 2-point scale. Predictions of state policy liberalism for 
ideologies that subgroups never actually hold thus would be highly unreliable. Cf. GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra 
note 258, at 87 (displaying predicted W-Nominate scores for racial groups’ twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth 
ideology percentiles) 
372 See infra appx. tbl.2. 
373 See id. 
374 See id. Protestant ideology is significant at the 10% level but not at the 5% level. 
375 In order to obtain sufficient sample sizes for all denominations, I recoded as Protestant respondents 
who identified as Mormon or Other Christian, and as Other respondents who identified as Jewish or Muslim. 
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Fourth, in the model for income, none of the coefficients for size-weighted 
ideology rises to the level of statistical significance either.376 (Though that for 
respondents earning more than $75,000 per year barely misses, and that for 
respondents earning less than $30,000 is negative.377) In Figure 2’s fourth panel, 
state policy liberalism goes from about -2 (or roughly Louisiana’s policy set) to 
about 3 (or roughly Delaware’s) as the ideologies of those making more than 
$75,000, or between $30,000 and $75,000, shift from their tenth to their ninetieth 
percentiles. But state policy liberalism actually decreases from about 1 (or 
roughly Ohio’s policy set) to about -1 (or roughly New Hampshire’s) as the 
ideology of those making less than $30,000 varies over the same range. 
Fifth, in what is becoming a trend, none of the coefficients in the models for 
age and education rises to statistical significance.378 (Though, again, one comes 
close: that for respondents with up to a high school education.379) Figure 2’s fifth 
and sixth panels show that state policy is about equally responsive to the 
ideologies of most age and education groups: respondents aged 18 to 29, 30 to 
39, 40 to 49, and 60 and up, as well as respondents with up to a high school 
education, with some college education, and with a college degree. However, 
state policy seems to be negatively (though not significantly) responsive to the 
ideologies of respondents aged 50 to 59, and with a postgraduate degree. These 
somewhat unexpected results warrant further investigation. 
Lastly, in the model for residence, the coefficients for size-weighted urban 
and suburban ideology both are positive and statistically significant. In contrast, 
the coefficient for size-weighted rural ideology is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. Figure 2’s seventh panel supports this account of urban and suburban 
influence paired with rural weakness. As urban and suburban ideologies vary 
from their tenth to their ninetieth percentiles, state policy liberalism goes from 
about -3 (or roughly South Carolina’s policy set) to about 3 (or roughly 
Delaware’s). But as rural ideology shifts over the same range, state policy 
liberalism holds steady at about 0 (or roughly Oregon’s policy set).  
This concludes what may have seemed, to some readers, like an unending 
hail of statistics. Next, I consider what these regression results and predicted 
value charts actually tell us about political powerlessness. I address their 
implications for both the methodology of determining powerlessness, and the 
broader substantive question of which groups should be deemed powerless. 
 
  
                                                 
376 See id. 
377 See id. The ideology of respondents earning more than $75,000 per year has a p-value of .059. 
378 See id. 
379 See id. The ideology of respondents with up to a high school education is significant at the 10% level 
but not at the 5% level. 
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FIGURE 2: PREDICTED STATE POLICY LIBERALISM VERSUS GROUP IDEOLOGY 
PERCENTILE 
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C. Discussion 
 
The most important point about the above analyses is that they demonstrate 
that powerlessness, as I define it, is measurable. There exist models (and data to 
insert into them) that reveal how responsive policy outcomes are to different 
groups’ preferences, controlling for the groups’ size and type. And these models 
(and data) do not just exist. Rather, they have been discussed extensively in the 
political science literature, which has concluded that they are the proper way to 
quantify policy responsiveness by group.380 As I noted earlier, the exact model 
specification I used has been employed previously by Flavin, Rigby and Wright, 
and several other scholars.381 All of the data I worked with also has been relied 
on by prior studies of responsiveness.382 
The second key point is the impressive consistency of the federal and state 
analyses, both with each other and with existing work. I found that blacks are 
relatively powerless at both the federal and state levels; so too have Griffin and 
Newman (at the federal level).383 I also found that the poor are relatively 
powerless at both the federal and state levels; again, so too have Gilens (at the 
federal level) and Flavin, Rigby, and Wright (at the state level).384 And as for 
classifications not yet studied by other scholars,385 my results for gender and 
religion were highly compatible as well. Women are relatively powerless at both 
the federal and state levels, while no religious group appears overly weak at 
either level. This consistency is quite heartening. It means that powerlessness 
determinations are robust to the use of completely different data from completely 
different jurisdictions. 
It is true that the federal and state analyses are not entirely in sync. 
Hispanics, for instance, are relatively powerless at the federal level386 but not at 
the state level. Similarly, the gap between the influence of the poor and that of 
other income groups is more glaring at the federal level. In my view, these 
inconsistencies are fairly minor, involving just a few of the models’ many 
groups. It also is unclear that they are discrepancies at all. It may well be that in 
the federal system, with its malapportioned Senate, filibuster, and very expensive 
campaigns and lobbying, Hispanics and the poor have little clout. But they may 
be more politically potent in the states, whose institutions typically are more 
                                                 
380 See supra note 324. In the first important work on responsiveness by income group, Bartels did not 
include groups’ population shares separately in his models. See BARTELS, supra note 311, at 257-62. Bhatti and 
Erikson subsequently pointed out this omission, see Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 229-30, and all later 
studies have used the same specification that I employ. 
381 See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
382 See GILENS, supra note 42, at 50-69 (discussing his database of group preferences and federal policy 
outcomes); Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 238-40 (using exit poll data to study senators’ responsiveness); 
Flavin, supra note 302, at 40-42 (using Sorens data to measure state policy outcomes); Rigby & Wright, supra 
note 303, at 195, 199, 207-08, 213-14 (same). 
383 See supra Section III.A. 
384 See supra Section III.D. 
385 These classifications, that is, have not yet been studied using an appropriate methodology. See supra 
Section III.B (explaining that existing gender studies focus on representation rather than policy enactment).  
386 Though, even at this level, a Wald test fails to distinguish their influence from that of whites. See supra 
note 330. Hispanics thus may not be powerless at either level. 
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majoritarian and less costly. Notably, my results for the poor are almost identical 
substantively to those of Gilens, Flavin, and Rigby and Wright.387 This 
convergence suggests that the poor’s sway does vary somewhat by governmental 
level. 
It also is true that the state analysis captures my notion of powerlessness less 
precisely than its federal counterpart. By aggregating group preferences and 
policy outcomes from the beginning, the former abstracts away the details of 
individual issues. It is cruder than Gilens’s approach of using particular policies, 
not whole states, as the basic unit of study.388 But, while correct, this critique 
should not be overstated. Even though it is suboptimal, the state analysis satisfies 
all of the criteria of a suitable methodology. It examines enacted policy, in many 
areas at once, while controlling for group size and type. It also avoids the need to 
adjust for preference intensity by considering ideologies in their entirety rather 
than specific agenda items.389 Moreover, it is possible that Gilens’s method soon 
will be feasible at the state level. Data on state publics’ issue-specific views is 
proliferating, thanks to the emergence of a new estimation technique, and it 
would take just a few tweaks to this technique to produce opinion figures for 
state subgroups too.390 In the near future, then, state analysis may require no 
sacrifice in sophistication. 
A final objection relates to judicial capacity. Even if political scientists can 
assess group influence accurately, how can courts possibly do so? The very idea 
of judges running regression models and creating predicted value charts, in the 
style of the last two Sections, is preposterous. Much less far-fetched, though, is 
the notion of courts endorsing a definition of powerlessness that hinges on 
empirical evidence, and then admitting expert testimony that supplies this 
evidence. In fact, this is exactly how courts have tackled an array of election law 
issues: how many people are harmed by a voting restriction,391 what the level of 
racial polarization is in an area,392 what share of minority voters is needed so they 
can elect their preferred candidate,393 and so on. Courts have never tried to 
                                                 
387 Like Gilens, I find a large gap in favor of the wealthy at the federal level. See GILENS, supra note 42, at 
77-85. And like Flavin, Rigby, and Wright, I find that the influence of the poor is indistinguishable from zero at 
the state level, while the middle-class and the wealthy wield comparable power, which is sometimes but not 
always statistically significant. See Flavin, supra note 302, at 41; Rigby & Wright, supra note 303, at 207-08, 
213-14. 
388 See GILENS, supra note 42, at 50-69. 
389 See supra note 354 and accompanying text. 
390 As noted earlier, Lax and Phillips already have produced estimates of state publics’ views on thirty-
nine separate issues, see supra note 347, and MRP needs only a few adjustments at the poststratification stage to 
generate figures for subgroups rather than populations in their entirety. If the large national surveys used by 
Tausanovitch and Warshaw, see supra note 349, were paired with the revised MRP procedure, Gilens’s method 
likely would become feasible at the state level. 
391 This is a crucial issue whenever plaintiffs claim that a franchise restriction amounts to an 
unconstitutional burden on the right to vote. See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 2014 WL 5090258, at *21 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 9, 2014) (noting that “[s]everal experts were tasked with determining the number of registered voters who 
might [be affected by Texas’s photo identification requirement]”). 
392 Racial polarization in voting is one of the three preconditions for liability under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986). 
393 Whether there is a sufficiently large minority population to elect its preferred candidate is also a 
precondition for liability under Section 2. See id. at 50. 
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answer these questions on their own. Instead, they have called upon experts to 
assist them, and then relied heavily on their contributions. Political powerlessness 
doctrine could operate in the same fashion. 
Indeed, its operation would be comparatively less taxing for the judiciary. In 
other fields, courts must admit, and then grapple with, expert testimony every 
time that a certain claim is made. But powerlessness is not itself a cause of 
action, but rather a factor that bears on a group’s suspect status. And a group’s 
suspect status is fixed nationally by the Supreme Court, and then revisited only 
rarely.394 It is not up for grabs in every lawsuit. Accordingly, courts would need 
to evaluate a group’s influence in only a handful of extraordinary cases. In the 
vast majority of equal protection litigation, courts would simply apply the type of 
scrutiny entailed by a group’s preset status. The vexing empirics would be 
irrelevant. 
Assume, then, that my definition of powerlessness is manageable, and that 
the results I presented earlier are reliable. What would be the legal implications? 
Below, I go through the classifications that I covered in the federal and state 
analyses: race, gender, religion, income, age, education, and residence. For each, 
I comment on whether (and how) current doctrine would have to change if the 
results were taken seriously. For the sake of analytical simplicity, I also equate 
suspect status and powerlessness here, even though the former obviously is not 
solely a function of the latter.395 I further streamline the analysis by concluding 
that a group is powerless only if (1) its preferences do not have a statistically 
significant impact on policy outcomes at either the federal or state levels; and (2) 
the preferences of another group of the same type do have such an impact.396 
Beginning with race, the legal status of blacks would not have to change at 
all. Blacks are a suspect class, at present,397 and they also are relatively powerless 
at both the federal and state levels. At both levels, their views have a much 
smaller effect on enacted policy than those of whites.398 Sadly, decades after the 
struggles of the civil rights era, blacks continue to require heightened judicial 
protection. On the other hand, Hispanics’ need for such protection may be 
lessening. At the federal level, the coefficient for Hispanic policy support is 
indistinguishable from zero, but it also is indistinguishable from the coefficient 
for white policy support.399 And at the state level, the coefficient for Hispanic 
ideology is positive and statistically significant. From these figures, it is difficult 
                                                 
394 See supra note 208 and accompanying text (recommending that powerlessness be assessed nationally). 
395 See supra notes 210-223 and accompanying text (explaining that it is unclear how four suspect class 
criteria are meant to be analyzed). 
396 Unfortunately, I am unable to comment on the classification that has attracted the most recent attention, 
homosexuality, because data on gay public opinion is unavailable at either the federal or state level. I also do 
not address the intersections of different groups—for example, black women or wealthy Protestants—due to 
data and space constraints. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
397 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (declaring race a suspect classification). 
398 For confirmation of my findings by other scholars (at the federal level), see Section III.A, supra. 
399 See supra notes 330, 386 (noting results of Wald test for Hispanic and white coefficients). Griffin and 
Newman also find that the Hispanic-white gap with respect to congressional representation is substantially 
smaller than the black-white gap. See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 87 (showing equally steep 
responsiveness slopes for whites and Hispanics, in contrast to much flatter slope for blacks). 
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to conclude that Hispanics are relatively powerless in the nation as a whole. At 
worst, they are weak in Washington but more potent in the states. 
Second, as to gender, the case for women’s suspect status remains 
compelling.400 At both the federal and state levels, women’s opinions exert much 
less influence than men’s on policy outcomes. At both levels, in fact, the gaps 
between male and female clout are the largest of any groups I analyzed in 
tandem. This is perhaps the study’s most surprising (and robust) finding. Despite 
their large population share and the range of laws protecting them from 
discrimination, women continue to be alarmingly powerless relative to men. 
Third, as to religion, current law seems to treat all denominations as suspect 
classes,401 but this treatment may no longer be necessary, at least for the groups 
for which data is available. In both the federal and state models, no coefficient 
for group preference rises to the level of statistical significance, indicating that no 
denomination is particularly strong or weak. This conclusion is bolstered by the 
predicted value charts, which show roughly equal slopes for all groups. However, 
it is important to note that only Protestants, Catholics, non-religious people, and a 
catch-all category were included in the analyses. It still is possible that smaller 
sects (such as Jews, Muslims, and Buddhists) or subgroups of larger traditions 
(such as evangelical and mainline Protestants) are relatively powerless. 
Fourth, as to income, there is a strong (though not ironclad) argument that 
courts are wrong not to deem the poor a suspect class.402 At the federal level, 
rising policy support at the tenth income percentile has a negative effect on the 
odds of policy enactment, suggesting a startling degree of impotence.403 At the 
state level too, the coefficient for low-income ideology is negative and 
indistinguishable from zero. At this level, though, the coefficient for high-income 
ideology just misses statistical significance, meaning that the gulf between rich 
and poor may not be quite as large. In sum, it is fair to say that the poor are 
relatively powerless overall, but that their weakness may not be quite as 
pronounced in the states.404 
Fifth, as to age and education, courts seem to have gotten it about right. They 
do not recognize any age or education group as a suspect class,405 nor should they 
                                                 
400 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (declaring gender a suspect classification). 
401 See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895) (apparently declaring 
religion a suspect classification). Almost no modern equal protection cases involve religious groups, likely 
because their claims tend to be adjudicated under the First Amendment—a provision about which I express no 
opinion here. 
402 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to recognize 
poor as suspect class). But see Ross & Li, supra note 54 (manuscript at 18-19) (noting that Court did not 
squarely confront suspect status of poor in Rodriguez). 
403 Like Gilens, I ran models only for the tenth and ninetieth percentiles and the fiftieth and ninetieth 
percentiles in Section IV.A. Running the same model for the tenth and fiftieth percentiles produces the 
following results: a positive and statistically significant coefficient for policy support at the fiftieth percentile, 
and a negative coefficient significant at the 10% level for policy support at the tenth percentile. These results 
are almost identical to the ones from the model for the tenth and ninetieth percentiles, and they indicate that the 
poor also are powerless relative to the middle-class. 
404 For confirmation of my findings by other scholars (at both the federal and state levels), see Section 
III.D, supra. 
405 See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (declining to recognize elderly 
as suspect class). The Supreme Court has never faced any education group’s claim to suspect status. 
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based on the state analysis. In the age and education models, no coefficient rises 
to the level of statistical significance. Similarly, in the predicted value charts, the 
slopes for most age and education groups are about the same. The exceptions, as 
observed earlier, are respondents aged 50 to 59 and respondents with a 
postgraduate degree, whose slopes both are negative (though not significantly 
so). These results require further study, but, at present, they do not justify a 
verdict of powerlessness for either group. 
Finally, as to residence, courts have never confronted a claim to suspect 
status by any residential group. But if they were faced with such a claim by rural 
inhabitants, they should be receptive to it. In the relevant state model, the 
coefficient for rural ideology is indistinguishable from zero, while those for 
urban and suburban ideology both are positive and statistically significant. 
Likewise, in the corresponding chart, the slope for rural ideology is nearly flat, 
while those for urban and suburban ideology are tilted upward. These findings 
would benefit from confirmation at the federal level, but their upshot is that rural 
dwellers are powerless relative to their urban and suburban neighbors. 
All in all, then, current doctrine is consistent with the empirical evidence in 
some areas and at odds with it in others. Figure 3 summarizes the points of 
agreement and dispute. Its vertical axis shows whether or not courts deem each 
group powerless (again equating suspect status and powerlessness for present 
purposes), and its horizontal axis does the same for this Part’s analyses. The 
upper-left and lower-right quadrants, colored in green, contain the groups as to 
which the approaches converge. The doctrine and the empirics concur that blacks 
and women are relatively powerless, and that whites, men, the non-poor, all age 
groups, all education groups, and the non-rural are not. Conversely, the lower-left 
and upper-right quadrants, colored in red, contain the groups as to which the 
approaches diverge. Hispanics and religious groups are relatively powerless 
according to the doctrine but not the empirics. And the poor and rural dwellers 
are relatively powerless according to the empirics but not the doctrine.  
Equal protection law thus would look quite—but not completely—different if 
suspect status were based only on my definition of powerlessness.406 Nothing 
would change for most groups, including blacks and women. But laws 
discriminating against Hispanics and religious groups no longer would be subject 
to more rigorous review, while laws discriminating against the poor and rural 
dwellers now would be. Into which bucket each group falls, though, ultimately is 
of secondary importance. The crucial point is that, under my approach, 
powerlessness would be analyzed in a theoretically and empirically defensible 
manner. A group would be deemed to lack sufficient influence if, and only if, its 
aggregate policy preferences were less likely to be enacted than those of similarly 
sized and classified groups. In the end, my proposal should rise or fall based on 
the appeal of this idea—not the identities of the groups that it benefits or harms. 
                                                 
406 Again, this is a big if, which I am stipulating here only for the sake of analytical tractability. See supra 
notes 210-223 and accompanying text (discussing how various indicia might be related to ultimate 
determination of suspect status). 
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FIGURE 3: POWERLESSNESS DETERMINATIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW AND 
ACCORDING TO EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I am not the first to notice the incoherence at the core of the powerlessness 
doctrine. Eskridge and Schacter, among others, also have documented the many 
conflicting conceptions of influence that courts have embraced at different 
times.407 These scholars, though, have responded to the disorder by calling for the 
doctrine’s elimination. Eskridge, for instance, has argued that, while 
powerlessness “may cast light on the perseverance of prejudice and 
stereotyping,” it should not be a separate criterion for suspect status.408 More 
dramatically, Schacter has advocated the interment of the theory from which the 
doctrine is derived in the first place. In her words, pluralism “lacks the internal 
normative apparatus to answer the very question it makes central—whether a 
group is sufficiently disadvantaged in the political process to warrant special 
judicial solicitude.”409 
What distinguishes this project from prior works, then, is that I have sought 
to rebuild the powerlessness doctrine, not to reject it. I have offered a definition 
of powerlessness that follows directly from pluralist theory, in that it focuses on 
the likelihood that a group’s aggregate policy preferences will be enacted. I also 
have shown that this definition can be operationalized using data and models that 
are widely accepted by political scientists. My perspective on powerlessness thus 
is markedly more optimistic than Eskridge and Schacter’s. They see the 
doctrine’s failures to date and conclude that it is inherently flawed. To me, in 
contrast, these shortfalls merely reveal a body of law that has not yet worked 
itself pure. Pluralism does not lack the normative apparatus to determine whether 
a group is powerless. The problem is just that its apparatus has not yet been put 
to good use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
407 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 53, at 10-19 (tracing courts’ conflicting applications of powerlessness 
doctrine); Schacter, supra note 76, at 1372-90 (same); see also supra note 79 (listing scholars who have 
criticized powerlessness doctrine for its lack of clarity). 
408 Eskridge, supra note 53, at 20. 
409 Schacter, supra note 76, at 1369 (actually referring to Ely’s political process theory, which itself is 
derived, in relevant part, from pluralism). 
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TABLE 1: FEDERAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
White vs. 
Black 
White vs. 
Hispanic 
Male vs. 
Female 
Protestant 
vs. Catholic 
Protestant 
vs. Secular 
50th Pct. vs. 
90th Pct. 
10th Pct. vs. 
90th Pct. 
                
White Weighted Support 4.224*** 3.226*** 
     
 
(0.747) (0.731) 
     White Share -0.953 57.87 
     
 
(7.480) (49.29) 
     Black Weighted Support -5.808* 
      
 
(3.483) 
      Black Share -72.40 
      
 
(133.8) 
      Hispanic Weighted Support 
 
-0.452 
     
  
(4.435) 
     Hispanic Share 
 
89.03 
     
  
(82.92) 
     Male Weighted Support 
  
17.63*** 
    
   
(2.782) 
    Male Share 
  
-324.1*** 
    
   
(57.66) 
    Female Weighted Support 
  
-9.152*** 
    
   
(1.640) 
    Protestant Weighted Support 
   
0.573 1.946 
  
    
(6.767) (1.476) 
  Protestant Share 
   
17.92* -13.20 
  
    
(9.236) (10.28) 
  Catholic Weighted Support 
   
-13.39 
   
    
(12.63) 
   Catholic Share 
   
0.830 
   
    
(33.01) 
   Secular Weighted Support 
    
3.613 
  
     
(7.769) 
  Secular Share 
    
-36.07** 
  
     
(16.36) 
  90th Percentile Support 
     
3.315*** 3.404*** 
      
(0.996) (0.543) 
50th Percentile Support 
     
-1.468* 
 
      
(0.817) 
 
10th Percentile Support 
      
-1.509*** 
       
(0.496) 
Constant 7.365 -53.53 155.5*** -10.62 9.797 -1.845*** -1.808*** 
 
(21.58) (44.60) (28.05) (10.93) (7.524) (0.420) (0.267) 
        Observations 891 718 427 46 297 388 852 
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
  
 
 
TABLE 2: STATE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Race Gender Religion 
        
White Weighted Ideology 27.62*** 
  
 
(4.361) 
  White Share 4.084 
  
 
(4.608) 
  Black Weighted Ideology 86.28 
  
 
(57.32) 
  Black Share -7.473 
  
 
(6.852) 
  Hispanic Weighted Ideology 266.0*** 
  
 
(65.00) 
  Hispanic Share -25.16** 
  
 
(9.357) 
  Male Weighted Ideology 
 
87.46*** 
 
  
(28.98) 
 
Male Share 
 
-15.83 
 
  
(136.7) 
 
Female Weighted Ideology 
 
-0.214 
 
  
(21.33) 
 
Female Share 
 
-61.99 
 
  
(148.3) 
 
Protestant Weighted Ideology 
  
37.95* 
   
(21.03) 
Protestant Share 
  
1.184 
   
(7.372) 
Catholic Weighted Ideology 
  
60.72 
   
(36.21) 
Catholic Share 
  
-0.271 
   
(7.851) 
Other Rel. Weighted Ideology 
  
105.1 
   
(97.28) 
Other Rel. Share 
  
-93.25*** 
   
(33.87) 
No Rel. Weighted Ideology 
  
26.69 
   
(86.52) 
No Rel. Share 
  
33.69 
   
(25.31) 
Constant -5.473 31.48 -0.217 
 
(4.239) (140.8) (1.617) 
    Observations 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.844 0.738 0.790 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
   (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Income Age 
      
<$30K Weighted Ideology -31.87 
 
 
(45.94) 
 
<$30K Share -17.30 
 
 
(13.80) 
 
$30-75K Weighted Ideology 40.63 
 
 
(28.57) 
 
$30-75K Share 17.79 
 
 
(11.34) 
 
>$75K Weighted Ideology 44.83* 
 
 
(23.12) 
 
>$75K Share -26.49*** 
 
 
(8.861) 
 
18-29 Weighted Ideology 
 
26.38 
  
(45.24) 
18-29 Share 
 
147.0 
  
(233.5) 
30-39 Weighted Ideology 
 
99.29 
  
(66.98) 
30-39 Share 
 
98.52 
  
(253.7) 
40-49 Weighted Ideology 
 
78.48 
  
(59.22) 
40-49 Share 
 
99.59 
  
(239.1) 
50-59 Weighted Ideology 
 
-61.57 
  
(55.89) 
50-59 Share 
 
206.8 
  
(246.0) 
60+ Weighted Ideology 
 
55.30 
  
(39.79) 
60+ Share 
 
117.7 
  
(245.2) 
Constant -0.00508 -138.8 
 
(5.649) (241.0) 
   Observations 50 50 
R-squared 0.786 0.759 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Education Residence 
      
Up to HS Weighted Ideology 108.8* 
 
 
(54.08) 
 
Up to HS Share -21.39 
 
 
(16.82) 
 
Some Col. Weighted Ideology 50.54 
 
 
(47.72) 
 
Some Col. Share 7.191 
 
 
(17.83) 
 
Col. Grad Weighted Ideology 63.13 
 
 
(65.11) 
 
Col. Grad Share -19.52 
 
 
(20.70) 
 
Post Grad Weighted Ideology -46.86 
 
 
(72.16) 
 
Post Grad Share -22.60 
 
 
(19.95) 
 
Urban Weighted Ideology 
 
46.30*** 
  
(12.79) 
Urban Share 
 
-4.229 
  
(4.453) 
Suburban Weighted Ideology 
 
47.61*** 
  
(11.60) 
Suburban Share 
 
-9.001** 
  
(3.919) 
Rural Weighted Ideology 
 
7.247 
  
(14.64) 
Rural Share 
 
7.014 
  
(4.948) 
Constant 1.900 -1.330 
 
(1.511) (3.119) 
   Observations 50 46 
R-squared 0.693 0.811 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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